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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to explain the redevelopment of Old Beijing during the
period 1990-2002. During this time, at least one third of the Old City was trans-
formed from an urban fabric consisting principally of courtyard houses (siheyuan)
and narrow lanes (hutongs) to one comprised of wide roads and hi-rise buildings.
This thesis starts from the premise that this redevelopment has had devastating
social and cultural costs in terms of excessive relocation and destruction of the
historic urban fabric and that it is possible to develop a pattern of redevelopment
that better balances the social, cultural and economic needs of Beijing's citizens.
Understanding the driving forces of the current pattern of redevelopment is a
necessary preliminary step towards doing so.
This thesis therefore attempts to explain the course of redevelopment in
the Old City, arguing that is has been enabled by a series of market reforms but
is predominantly shaped by the political objectives of the politicians controlling
the development process. Accordingly, redevelopment is carried out with the prin-
ciple goal of advancing visible economic development notwithstanding the social
and cultural cost. Two case-studies are examined to test this proposition: the
development of Finance Street, a 105 he CBD and Nanchizi, a smaller conserva-
tion area.
The thesis concludes that both case-studies demonstrate the failure of
planning policies in the face of political objectives, and suggests a series of pos-
sible directions for improving the redevelopment process in Beijing.
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1.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the redevelopment of Old Beijing in the period from
1990 to 2002. During this time, at least 25km2 of the Old City was redeveloped,
generally from a hutong (narrow lane) and siheyuan (courtyard home) environ-
ment to one comprised of hi-rise buildings and wide roads. According to various
estimates, as many as 700,000 residents were relocated in this period, typically
to distant suburbs as much as 30km away from their original homes and commu-
nities.1 To a great extent, Old Beijing has been and continues to be transformed
from a city with a historic urban fabric and way of life to an increasingly congest-
ed enclave of wealthy residents and commercial interests.
This transformation has been considered an enormous success by
many. Both within and outside the city, Beijing is considered a 'booming' capital.
Through the '90s to the present, construction cranes could be seen throughout
the city with builders working around the clock. As a generator of wealth and eco-
nomic development, the city is clearly more successful than ever, and both per
capita incomes and living standards have risen dramatically. In addition to sev-
eral new residential and commercial areas, the city can boast some very impres-
sive new infrastructure, including three new ring roads, several new avenues and
a new airport and railway station. By 2008 the city plans to have completed 13
subway lines, and the Olympic Games in that year promises to be an opportunity
to show off the transformed Beijing to the world.
But as in almost all urban redevelopment, there have been winners and
losers. While the transformation of the city has clearly benefited many interests,
it has arguably come at an enormous, even devastating, cost. In particular, rede-
velopment has been criticized for three principle reasons: because of the destruc-
tion of 'too much' of the historic fabric with inadequate and ineffective measures
to conserve it; because of the construction which has replaced this fabric which
has been considered by many commentators to be over scaled, inhospitable and
out-of-character for the Old City of Beijing; and finally because too many of the
original residents have been relocated outside of the Old City, not only disman-
tling communities but depriving the inner city of its human capital. While these
concerns are not shared universally, they do raise the issue of whether and how
the process by which the Old City is redeveloped can be improved, from both a
conservation and social perspective.
Fig. 1.1: Beijing Municipality. A substantial proportion of the
Old City has been redeveloped over the past 15 years.
1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS
This critique - extensively documented in numerous other places - is not,
however, the main focus of this thesis, which instead intends to address the issue
of why redevelopment has occurred and taken the shape that it has. The premise
of this thesis is that a better understanding of the forces shaping development
- or failing to do so - may enable redevelopment that better balances the eco-
nomic, cultural and social needs of Beijing's citizens.
Before addressing this issue, this chapter will introduce Beijing and the
redevelopment of the Old City, surveying briefly the historical and cultural impor-
tance of Old Beijing, the redevelopment of the past 12 years and its roots, and
expanding on the critique outlined above.
Chapters Two and Three seek to answer the main question of this thesis
- why redevelopment occurs the way it does - in two parts: by examining the
context and the politics of redevelopment. Chapter Two first explores the context
for redevelopment in the city, exploring how a series of reforms established a
land market and real estate industry and empowered local government to both
manage and drive redevelopment amidst a rapidly changing political economy.
The chapter will also explore how, despite these changes, the development
process is still one that is marred by institutional bureaucracy and predominantly
dominated by cadres whose political objectives often override social and cultural
needs.
Chapter Three examines the political objectives that actually shape rede-
velopment. The chapter explores the need for local government to demonstrate
economic development - measured in 're-imaging' achievements, economic
targets, infrastructure development and revenue collection. The role of the de-
velopment companies who actually carry out redevelopment is also examined.
The urban redevelopment of Beijing is also situated in the context of renewal in
the US during the '50s and '60s, with the chapter exploring whether the kind of
growth coalition' which drove redevelopment there can be said to exist in Beijing.
Chapters Four and Five put the framework for understanding redevelop-
ment established in the previous chapters into the context of two case-studies of
Fig. 1.2: Redevelopment as a successful transformation. The bottom poster is an adver-
tisement for a family planning service set against the background of modern Beijing
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development with entirely different objectives. Chapter Four examines the devel-
opment of Finance Street, designed as a 105 hectare CBD in the West District of
Beijing. Chapter Five explores the redevelopment of Nanchizi, which was in-
tended to conserve a historic area close to the Forbidden City. Both case-studies
intend to shed light on different aspects of the decision-making process involved
in redevelopment. They also attempt to explain, at least in part, two elements of
the critique described above: why redevelopment often results in such an inhos-
pitable environment (Chapter Four) and why successful conservation has proved
so difficult in Beijing (Chapter Five). Both examples reveal the conflict between
planning policies and the objectives of politicians, and the final chapter intends to
summarize the redevelopment process based on the case-studies and the pre-
ceding analysis, before outlining possible directions for its improvement based on
the this study.
1.3 HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL IMPORTANCE OF OLD BEIJING
The significance of damage to the urban fabric of Old Beijing cannot be
fully understood without some awareness of its historical and cultural importance.
This has been extensively documented
to serve as a brief overview. 2
The actual site of Beijing has
contained a settlement for over 3000
years, as its location was consid-
ered by several Chinese dynasties
as having ideal 'feng-shui' in be-
ing surrounded on three sides by
mountains. The actual physical form
of Old Beijing, however, dates from
1272, when Kublai Khan of the Yuan
dynasty laid out the city. Then called
Dadu, the city was "grandly con-
ceived and methodically planned",
with broad, rectangular blocks laid
out "in the checkerboard pattern
elsewhere, and the following is intended
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Fig. 1.3: A spatial history of Beijing
that still characterizes the city".3 The layout of the city followed rules of capital
layout set out in 'Kao Gong Ji' section of the Zhou dynasty document the 'Zhouli':
the main buildings were laid out symmetrically along the central axis, and walls
enclosed the city. The Palace quarter - the Forbidden City - was located at the
center, where the emperor was to reside to symbolize both the centralization of
power as well as his mandate from Heaven to rule.
It was also around this time that the residential fabric of the city - the
hutongs and siheyuan - were constructed in the positions they generally would
occupy until redevelopment. Both have become so bound up in both domestic
and foreign perceptions of Beijing that they are practically synonymous with the
city. The siheyuan or courtyard home, for example, "is particularly renown world-
wide for the way it is an integral part of Beijing's entire layout - as the basic,
microcosmic unit of a capital city plan that is in itself cosmological in scale and
intent".4 Similarly the hutongs, constructed as narrow lanes running on either
side of the main and smaller streets of the city to provide access to residential
siheyuan, have also come to be considered as quintessentially representative of
Beijing. This is true not only because they provide, with the siheyuan, the ideal
backdrop for Beijing's monuments but also because of the unique street life that
has developed within them. One journalist recently described a typical scene in
a hutong: "an old woman sits in the corner of an old lane, sewing a shirt in the
sunshine; a group of middle-aged residents beside the grey walls of old houses;
a young man reads the newspaper on a traditional porch, inscribed with images
of lilies and fish...".5
Fig. 1.4: A typical siheyuan and hutong. Both provide a backdrop which contributes to the
majesty of Beijing's monuments. In the background of the right photo is the White Pagoda.
The significance of Old Beijing, however, was greater than the sum of its
hutongs and siheyuans, or even the fact that its collection of cultural relics and
historic buildings exceeded that of any other Chinese city. It was the arrangement
of all of these items to form a magnificent, integrated whole that made Beijing
particularly special. The roofscape of the city, for example, "...was composed of
soaring roofs of yellow, green and blue and a vast number of small grey rooftops,
which were all unified in their graceful curvature, like so many waves upon the
sea...". 6 It was this kind of artistic unity that prompted renowned architect and
city planner Liang Si-Chen to comment that: "Beijing is an unparalleled urban
planning masterpiece", and urbanist Edmund Bacon to write that the city was
"possibly the single greatest work of man on the face of the earth".7 This status
prompted Liang to comment that preservation in the city "...should not be con-
fined to a single hall, temple or pagoda...great care should be taken to preserve
surrounding buildings which are part of the entire complex, and to the overall set-
ting of the complex".8
Timeline
1045 B.C. Ji city founded in Beijing area
916- Renamed Nanjing, capital of Liao, serves for the first time as the capital of the
1125AD middle kingdom
1153 Renamed Zhongdu capital of Jin
1215 Occupied by Genghis Khan and renamed Yanjing
1272 Genghis' Khan's grandson, Kublai Khan, founds Dadu, capital of Yuan Dynasty
and forerunner to contemporary Beijing
1368 Renamed Beiping under the Ming empire
1403 Renamed Beijing
1406 Construction of the Forbidden City
1421 Became the Ming capital. Several important new governmental and imperial
structures are built
1564 Expanded further south to its present size
1644 Became the capital of the Qing dynasty. During this period, Beijing grows greatly
in geographical size, and many gardens are built in the western suburbs and many
older buildings are restored.
1860 British and French allied forces invade the city
1900 The eight-power allied forces invades the city to suppress the Boxer Movement
1911 Sun Yat-sen's revolution puts an end to the rule of the Qing
1912 Founding of the Republic of China. Private armies and warlords continue to hold
much control, and foreign powers controlled several economic zones
1928 Renamed Beiping, a special municipality. The national capital is shifted to Nanjing
1937 Japanese army invades the city
1945 Japan surrenders and Civil War restarts
1949 Communist Party takes control of China, Beiping renamed back to Beijing and
designated as capital
1950 Liang Si-Cheng and Chen Zan-Xian propose location of the adminstative center
in the West Suburbs. The proposal is rejected in favour of a centrally located
adminstrative center.
1953 City Masterplan (1953-7) designates 1m ft2 of 'old housing to be demolished',
warns of danger of 'extreme respect for old architecture that might constrict
development'
1954-67 Demolition of City Walls
1958 Redevelopment of Tianamen Square
1958-9 Ten Major Building Projects
1960 USSR pulls out aid and advisors from China
1966 Cultural Revolution begins
1976 Cultural Revolution ends with overthrow of 'Gang of Four'
1979 Deng Xiaoping's Opening-up policy. China, and Beijing, are opened to Westerners
for the first time in thirty years
1980 Construction of the 2 nd Ring Road and subway ring
1990 Acceleration of Old and Dilipidated Housing Renewal Program
1994 District Government given greater control over ODHR program
Figure 1.5. A brief chronology of Beijing
1.4 ROOTS OF REDEVELOPMENT
This historic and cultural properties of Beijing were jeopardized, however,
almost as soon as the Communists came into power in 1949. During the Qing
dynasty (1644-1911), the city had changed little, although the start of the 20th
century and the Republican period (1911-49) saw the beginnings of the tension
between modernization and traditionalism which would continue to the present.
However, for the most part, the city that the Communists inherited and designat-
ed as their capital in 1949 was remarkably similar to how it had been at the end
of the Qing dynasty.
Arguably, it was precisely the cultural and historic significance of the city
that threatened the Communists. To them, the city represented a physical mani-
festation of the old, 'feudal' order which had to be rejected. Accordingly, at the
very beginning of the Communist period, the tearing down of the Forbidden City
was even considered; ultimately this was rejected as too drastic a step.9 Instead
it was decided to 'let the past serve the present' and appropriate both the image
and the physical manifestation of this icon of the previous regime to bolster the
prestige of the new government. Some changes were, however, deemed critical
to adapt Beijing into its new role as a socialist capital. Tiananmen Square was to
be adapted through expansion from a palace square to a people's square, while
Chang'An Avenue, the major road which bisects Beijing and passes through the
Square, would be drastically widened in order to host parades. In 1958-9 ten ma-
jor construction projects were carried out to demonstrate the regime's capabili-
ties, including a number of buildings around the Square. Not all the monuments
Fig. 1.6: Redevelopment in the 50's: the widening of Chang'An Avenue (above) and Re-
design of Tiananmen Square (below) were intended to adapt the city into a Communist
Capital
in the city, however, were deemed suitable for appropriation, and the City Walls
were perhaps the most famous artifact to be destroyed - during the 1950s and
60's - despite a proposal to convert them into an elevated garden.
With the symbolic center of the regime clearly in the heart of Old Beijing,
debate ensued over whether the actual administrative center of the govern-
ment also needed to be there. Liang Si-Chen in particular argued strongly for
the creation of a new administrative center in the Western suburbs which would
enable preservation of the Old City.10 However, the ultimate decision - which was
decisively influenced by the Soviet advisors present - was to locate the adminis-
trative center in the physical center of the city, around the Forbidden City, and to
utilize or demolish existing buildings to make way for the center. This was justi-
fied on 'practical' grounds - the country could not afford to build a new city - as
well as political grounds: the seat of government should not be separated from
the symbolic and historic center of Beijing and the country. Even Stalin was said
to have dismissed the idea of building a new capital to preserve the Old City as a
bourgeois idea. Many observers have seen that decision as essentially dooming
the Old City, making the encroachment on its historic architecture and urban form
by modern developments inevitable. As Wu has put it: "It is not unreasonable to
say that most of Beijing's conservation and traffic management problems stem
from the choice of this site"."
Aside from the monuments, the Communists placed little value on the rest
of Beijing's urban fabric. The siheyuan were considered to be politically incor-
rect relics of the feudal era, both symbolically and practically unsuitable for the
new era. Accordingly, the idea of comprehensively redeveloping Beijing was laid
down: the 1957 Master plan recommended the demolition of 1 m ft2 of 'old' hous-
ing annually. 12 The 1953 Master plan for the city even commented that "the
major danger for Beijing is extreme respect for old buildings which constricts de-
velopment". Similarly, little value was also placed on the hutongs, as the regime
preferred roads which were wide enough to reflect the prestige of the state. The
city's transportation plan, first conceived in the 1950s, called for road-widening
measures which would ultimately eviscerate the fabric of the Old City: the plan
stipulated that in addition to the four ring roads which would surround the Old
City, many existing roads within the latter should be widened to form 'feeder' ar-
terial roads of a minimum width of 50-70m and smaller 'local' roads of 20-30m."
For the most part, however, redevelopment within the Old City proposed
in the 1950s was simply unfeasible for the Beijing government to carry out until
decades later, as they simply did not have the funds to demolish and relocate
existing homes and residents, even if they had wanted to. Almost all new con-
struction occurred outside the Old City. Until 1987, for example, over 80% of new
housing development had occurred in the suburbs.15 Redevelopment within the
Old City had concentrated on major symbolic projects, such as the Tiananmen
Square, Chang-An Avenue redevelopments, as well as the new administrative
center around the Forbidden City and the occasional residential development or
industrial complex. Indeed it was the converting of Beijing into an industrial cen-
ter, rather than the comprehensive redevelopment of the city, which was the key
ideological goal: as the Beijing Municipal Government commented in the early
'50s "...without the base of a modern industrial proletariat.. .our capital can only
be an extremely high level consumptive city,...this will not be suitable for the city's
status as the national capital". However, despite the new factories and changes
to the symbolic center of the city, the historic residential districts were largely
ignored by the regime.
But while the urban form of the city had remained largely intact, the ac-
tual residential buildings of the city - and particularly the siheyuan - had become
Fig. 1.7: 1953 Masterplan
dilapidated. From 1949-78, the government spent little on maintaining the now
largely state owned houses. Further, many of the homes had become overcrowd-
ed as a housing shortage induced the Municipal Government to settle families
in existing homes. The FAR of these homes essentially doubled from 0.35 to
0.7 as informal construction became widespread within them, and the siheyuan
thus became 'courtyard-less compounds' (see fig. 1.8). This would dramatically
weaken the argument for preserving them: if the siheyuans had been damaged
to the point where they could only be rebuilt, what exactly was worthy of preser-
vation? These issues would figure prominently in the conservation for Nanchizi,
described in Chapter Five.
1.5 REDEVELOPMENT SINCE 1990
Old Beijing, therefore, could be still considered to be relatively intact into
the 1980s. The poor living conditions of the majority of residents of Old Bei-
jing, however, placed substantial political pressure on the government to take
measures to improve them. Up until the 1980s, this was largely done through a
'decanting process' as housing built outside the Old City relieved the pressure
for accommodation on the inner city. By the beginning of the 1990s, however,
a series of market-oriented reforms - particularly the introduction of a land and
housing market - made inner-city redevelopment an economically viable option
for the first time, as the value of central locations could be captured through the
L
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Fig. 1.8: From 1949, the siheyuan became increasing cluttered and dilipadated
sale of commodity housing, and this could balance or exceed the costs for rede-
velopment. The government's approach to improving living conditions therefore
shifted to inner-city urban renewal, and the Old and Dilapidated Housing Renew-
al (ODHR) program was launched to manage the process.
Initially, the ODHR program focused on re-housing as many residents as
possible on the original site, and only selling as much housing or commercial
space as would be necessary to break even or turn over a small profit. However,
in time, the ODHR program evolved into a conventional urban renewal program,
with the majority of residents - in some projects all - relocated to cheaper land in
the suburbs, and the original sites used for commercial or luxury housing devel-
opments. In essence, the ODHR program started as a social welfare program but
became a mechanism for releasing land to Beijing's nascent real estate industry.
The nature of this evolution, as well as the reforms which enabled it to happen,
are explored in the next chapter.
The result has been that a huge proportion of Old Beijing has been rede-
veloped, although the exact quantity is unclear. One expert claimed in 2000 that
1/3 of the Old City had been redeveloped, while preservation activist Hua Xinmin
estimated that by that same year, half of the city's hutongs had been destroyed. 17
Another expert has estimated that the hutongs are disappearing at a rate of 600
a year, with just 1000 siheyuan remaining in the city.18 At minimum it is likely that
half of the Old City has been redeveloped, and possibly a far greater proportion,
given that the rate of redevelopment has not slowed in the last few years.
Similarly, no firm figures exist for the quantity of residents who have been
relocated. Journalist Mark O'Neill has estimated that as many as 700,000 resi-
dents have been relocated from the inner-city of Beijing, while official statistics re-
ferred to in the National People's Congress state that 160,000 households were
relocated.19 As these figures both refer to the period from 1990-2000, the current
quantity of residents relocated is likely to be far higher.
1.6 CRITIQUE OF REDEVELOPMENT
The redevelopment described above has been controversial, and as men-
tioned at the beginning of the chapter, three main criticisms have been made:
INSUFFICIENT AND INEFFECTIVE CONSERVATION 2 0
The Municipal Government's '25 Conservation Areas' plan intends to con-
serve approximately 17% of the urban fabric of Old Beijing. 21 Many commenta-
tors see this as insufficient, arguing that Beijing's artistic integrity warrants protec-
tion of the entire city, and not small parts of it. As one observer has commented:
"If you're going to compare (the city) to a beautiful face, this law protects the tip
of the nose and obliterates the rest".22 While now unrealistic, the protection of the
entire land area of Old Beijing is not as unfeasible as it might appear: Old Beijing
occupies just 65km2 or 10% of the land area of metropolitan Beijing. In theory,
there should have been enough land area for new development outside the Old
City. Furthermore, some observers see the true purpose of the conservation plan
as being a being a green light to redevelop the rest of Beijing, as developers and
planners can argue for the redevelopment of a particular historic area as it is 'not
23one of the protected zones'.
Worse, the actual mechanism by which the protected areas will be con-
served is very much open to question. Incredibly, it is possible for large-scale,
wholesale but nonetheless 'appropriate' redevelopment to qualify as conserva-
tion, which would never be acceptable in the West.24 In fact, if the redevelopment
of Nanchizi, which followed these lines and is discussed in Chapter Five, is a
working model for conservation in the remainder of the protected areas, there will
soon be almost no areas of genuine historic value in the city. Many experts think
that the real proportion of Old Beijing's fabric which will be genuinely protected is
actually closer to 5%.25
It is striking that this is a concern not simply of an academic elite or urban
planners, but also of many ordinary residents.26 Recently, 125 school children
wrote a letter to Mayor Liu Qi posing the question that "If a city does not have its
own culture and its own history, what makes it different from any other city?", and
commenting that "The skyscrapers we are building are commonplace, while our
courtyards and hutongs are unique in the world".27
Fig. 1.9: Three criticisms of redevelopment in Old Beijing: too much destruction of the
historic fabric (top), inappropriate construction replacing it (middle), and too much reloca-
tion (bottom)
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INAPPROPRIATE NEW CONSTRUCTION 28
Little of the new construction in Old Beijing has respected the historic
nature of the city. The market conditions that development in Old Beijing has re-
flected has necessitated developers seeking as high a FAR as possible, with little
or token concern for either the cultural context or 'usability' of the development,
beyond the need for investor-friendly design. Those projects which have respect-
ed their context - particularly those of the first phase of the ODHR program such
as the Ju'er Hutong, Dong Nan Yuan and Xiao Hou Cang developments - have
been exceptions. Interestingly, these projects were all designed with returning
Old Beijingers in mind; other development, by contrast, has been intended for a
more 'international' user, which perhaps explains why it has failed to acknowl-
edge its context, either with a suitable architectural style, height or FAR, or by
being designed according to the pedestrian-oriented scale that has traditionally
characterized Old Beijing.
In the words of one expert, the result has been that Old Beijing has be-
come like a "flea-infested scalp, with ugly patches spread all over the city".29
Another observer has commented that "The big new buildings are architectural
rubbish. They are ugly, permanent scars on the beautiful face of the imperial
city".30
Arguably, the Old City of Beijing was never suitable for the commercial or
high-end residential development that has occurred within its boundaries. The re-
sult has been substantial pressure on the city's infrastructure, which has resulted
in enormous congestion. The road widenings that have taken place to address
this have done little to improve traffic and have occurred at a vast cost in terms of
damage to the historic cityscape and loss of street life.31 Further, the increasing
desirability of the Old City as a real estate location has meant more pressure to
demolish and replace what remains of the historic fabric with high-end residential
buildings and commercial blocks. In a sense, the redevelopment of Beijing has
entered into a vicious cycle, with commercial development fueling the need for
further infrastructure and commercial development, placing even more pressure
on the renewal program and the historic fabric. The political climate of Beijing,
explored in Chapter Three, further exacerbates this process.
TOO MUCH RELOCATION 32
Despite the overcrowded and dilapidated state of housing in the Old City,
communities have arisen which have been described as "healthy and lively.... not
the slums that some outsiders may consider them to be".33 The impact on these
communities of redevelopment has arguably been one of the most damaging as-
pects of the renewal of the Old City, as several hundred thousand residents have
been relocated from their original homes.
Initially, the government's efforts to improve living standards was wel-
comed by the residents, especially as the early projects sought to improve living
conditions for residents whilst retaining them in their original location with aspects
of their original environment's qualities present. However, it rapidly became clear
that improving living conditions was narrowly defined in terms of living space
and facilities only, and not in terms of more broad 'quality of life' considerations.
Hence, relocating residents to high-rise apartment blocks in distant suburbs could
be classified as 'improving their living standard' even though on more compre-
hensive grounds it is questionable whether this has taken place.
Certainly, the Chinese Government has not acknowledged the traumatic
impact of relocation. It is widely acknowledged in the West that spatial identity
is a fundamental aspect of human life and that, as clinical psychologist Marc
Fried famously observed in the 1960s, "Grieving for a lost home is evidently a
widespread and serious social phenomenon following in the wake of urban dislo-
cation". There is evidence to suggest that this might be as true for Beijing resi-
dents as it was for residents of Boston's West End, who Fried was writing about.
As one commentator wrote of residents being relocated from De-Wai in the mid-
90s: "(they) expressed grief at leaving their homes of up to three decades".35 But
the comparative paucity of research on this issue reveals a shortfall in Chinese
academic and planning circles, who in the words of one observer , "...don't like to
look at problems. They like to create something new and beautiful".36
Notwithstanding the trauma of relocation, it is also not clear whether the
new environments actually do offer a better quality of life. Despite unquestionably
better facilities and increased space, there is considerable evidence that many
residents are less happy than before they were relocated. In one study, 76% of
households of the relocation area of Qinghe in the northwest fringe of the city re-
ported that "Service and management were not as good as in the Old City", 73%
reported an increasing cost of living due to their new inconvenient location and
46% reported an economic loss of income also as a result of their new location.
Perhaps most damningly, 50% of households reported that the major impact of
relocation was that "Life has become boring".37
In fact, the estate agent's mantra that location is the most important fac-
tor in desirability (and price) of a residence is as true in Old Beijing as anywhere.
Many residents therefore prefer substandard housing in the city center with "the
convenience of... public transport, good quality schools, hospitals, cinemas and
parks", which combined with "their attachment to (their) old neighborhoods...
far outweighs the poor conditions". Additionally, the conclusion of many West-
ern urban renewal studies suggests poorer people depend more on their social
ties - which are fragmented by relocation - than the middle-classes. Hence, it is
highly dubious to suggest that the lives of Old Beijingers who have been relocat-
ed to a remote and inconvenient location having had their physical social network
destroyed have been unambiguously improved by redevelopment. Indeed, in one
survey only 7% of residents indicated that would be willing to relocate to a subur-
ban location if given a choice.39 Certainly, there is clear evidence of their dissatis-
faction with the relocation procedure; according to Hua Xinmin, Beijing residents
have filed over 1000 lawsuits against demolition of their houses; unsurprisingly,
none have been successful."
If the former residents of Old Beijing have lost out in the redevelopment
process, so too can it be argued that the city itself is poorer in many senses by
their departure. This is true in a narrow economic sense - the well-being of the
city depends on the spatial proximity of a low-income as well as a high-income
labor force. But in a broader cultural sense, the city's character is largely defined
by its residents, and as the city becomes increasingly an enclave of the rich,
much of the charm of 'Old Beijing', even aside from the environmental change, is
lost. Indeed, perhaps the greatest loss in the redevelopment of Old Beijing has
been of the street life of the hutongs and the way of life that existed there, which
is a unique aspect to the city and totally irretrievable or recreatable once it has
been lost through unsympathetic redevelopment.
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Fig. 1.10: The Hutongs provide a unique streetlife environment not replicated in new de-
velopment
1.7 REDEVELOPMENT: THE 'PRICE' FOR 'PROGRESS'?
Many apologists for redevelopment have countered the critique described
above with a number of cultural and economic arguments. Critics have argued,
for example, that the trauma of relocation has been handled well by Beijing
residents, who are far more 'used' to upheaval than their Western counterparts.41
Or with regards to conservation, that the value of a historic urban fabric is very
different in China than in the West, where cities have been destroyed and rebuilt
historically on a frequent basis. Or with regards to possible defects in Beijing's
planning policy, that the Chinese as a whole are on a 'learning curve' and may
eventually come to improve their planning and conservation policies, but must
first 'learn from their own mistakes'. Or finally, and most convincingly, that the
hutongs and siheyuan may be charming relics of a by-gone era, but their conser-
vation would obstruct economic development - which after several decades of
appalling living standards is the most important goal for all Chinese - and there-
fore have no place in 'modern life'.
All of these arguments have, to different degrees, elements of truth in
them. However, I have met enough Beijing residents - residents, academics
and urban planners - who have been appalled and saddened with the course of
redevelopment to be skeptical of the notion that redevelopment is the inevitable,
necessary or acceptable price that Beijing residents have to pay for economic
progress. Certainly, this thesis is premised on the idea that economic develop-
ment and historic and social preservation are not conflicting objectives. There is
an enormous amount of land area for Beijing to expand and satisfy its economic
needs without sacrificing its historic and cultural heritage. As preservation activ-
ist Fang Ke has commented: "The city has plenty of space to expand.. .the urban
area today, at 320 square kilometers, is five times the size of the Old City". 2 This
thesis intends to demonstrate that the course of redevelopment is determined by
specific political and economic forces - which could, if the ultimate powers-that-
be chose, be countered to result in development that better balances the conser-
vation and social interests of the city with these forces.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
How did a socialist state which prohibited any kind of commercial activity
prior to 1978 ultimately come to administer an urban renewal program seem-
ingly driven by virulent capitalism? The answer lies in the evolving institutional
environment of urban development, in which a series of land and housing re-
forms made redevelopment financially viable and even profitable for the first time
while decentralization reforms empowered and incentivized local Government to
carry out this redevelopment. These reforms occurred as the political economy
of Beijing began to shift from being an industrially-oriented to a service-oriented
center, providing a huge demand for market-oriented (if not necessarily market-
demanded) development. Both this demand and the reforms were undoubtedly
important factors in establishing the momentum for redevelopment in Beijing, and
are discussed in this chapter.
Arguably as critical in explaining the context of redevelopment are the
'constants' - what has not been reformed. For the most part, reforms have been
gradual and experimental, and essentially grafted on to existing institutional
processes to form a 'hybrid' environment that is neither fully socialist or market-
oriented. The reforms have been unaccompanied by the political or even bureau-
cratic reforms that have accompanied the transition to a market economy in other
ex-Communist countries. Hence, this chapter argues that the real power in urban
development lies with the appointed politicians, and the development process
itself remains marred by a legacy of bureaucracy from the Socialist period.
2.2 THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY
The redevelopment of Old Beijing has reflected, and possibly facilitated,
structural shifts in the economy of the capital. Prior to 1978, Beijing was almost
exclusively an industrial and administrative center, and the goal of the develop-
ment process was largely to translate industrially-oriented economic plans into
urban space. Hence the development process existed essentially to choose
appropriate sites for industrial development. All other objectives were subsidiary.
Housing was built as one component of an industrial work-unit, and generally
considered a secondary priority as an ideologically 'consumptive' rather than
'productive' entity. Accordingly, living standards actually declined during the initial
decades of Communist rule, and by 1978 each person in Beijing had an average
of 3.6m 2 of living space.1 With no domestic or foreign private companies operat-
ing in China, there was almost no demand for commercial office space within the
city.
Deng's reforms, which began in 1978, signaled the beginning of a critical
shift in the government's aspirations for the economy of the city. New emphasis
was placed on the development of the tertiary sector of the economy, the opening
of markets to foreign companies, and improving the living standards of the popu-
lation. The results of these reforms were dramatic. From 1989 to 1995, the num-
ber of enterprises based on foreign capital or joint venture grew almost ten times,
from 1217 to 11202 establishments.2 Thousands of domestic Chinese enterprises
also opened offices in Beijing during this period. Overall, the tertiary sector rose
from representing 26.8% of the economy in 1978 to over half in 2000.3 Living
standards rose substantially as expenditure on housing rose from less than 8%
to 25% of total state capital expenditure by 1981.4
Given the new demand for housing and commercial office space for do-
mestic and foreign companies, there was tremendous pressure for new construc-
tion in Beijing. Through the 1980s, most of this pressure was absorbed outside
the Old City. Approximately 5 million m2 of housing was constructed annually on
greenfield or agricultural sites.5 At the start of the 1990s, however, this pressure
came to be absorbed by inner-city locations released by the ODHR program, and
the demand for real estate development in fact began to fuel the program, and
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Fig. 2.1:The changing economy of Beijing
encourage more and more land to be made available for development.
It soon became clear, however, that the existing institutional environment
for development was not suitable for the new political economy. First, the Cen-
tral Government was not well placed to manage or even to afford to build the
new constructions required, as they would typically have done according to the
existing Socialist pattern of development. Other agents would have to be found
to both construct developments and generate the revenue to do so. Second, it
was apparent that allocating free land, office space and housing to profit-oriented
companies - particularly foreign firms - was no longer appropriate, and further,
that charging for these commodities could be a source of revenue. To resolve
these issues, the government launched a series of reforms in an effort to reshape
the development environment.
2.3 THE REFORMS
As the reforms were a series of responses to problems, they were carried
out without a preconceived notion of what the mature housing and land markets
would be like. Hence they have tended to be experimental, incremental and in
many senses incomplete.
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DEVELOPMENT OFA LAND MARKET
The need to establish a land market became clear in the Special Eco-
nomic Zones during the 1980s, when the government was confronted with the
issue of how to allocate land to private companies and gain revenue from doing
so. The selling of land, however, was an ideological taboo in the socialist system,
which presumed that land was a public resource that should never be alienated
from public ownership. The solution to this was to allow 'land-use rights' to be
sold to users, while the actual ownership of land was retained by the state.
The first land-use rights were sold in Shenzhen in 1987, but it was not until
1992 that the Beijing Municipal Government began to lease land and enact sev-
eral local laws to implement a ground lease system.6 The amount of land leased
annually by the Beijing Government grew quickly from 0.4 he in 1992 to 100 he
in 1994. The government very quickly begun to realize how lucrative land-leasing
was, earning by the late '90s an average of 361 M$ per year, a significant propor-
tion of the city's total revenue of around 2B$ per year.
The establishment of a land market had critical consequences for Old Bei-
jing. For the first time since 1949, the land value of its central location could be
capitalized upon. In particular, relocation was essentially made possible because
of the difference in land price between suburban and inner-city locations. Accord-
ingly, redevelopment has been driven in part by the profitability of appropriating
valuable inner-city land, relocating the residents to cheap suburban land, and de-
veloping 'higher and better' uses on the land that exploit the land value. Hence,
the establishment of a land market has essentially enabled urban renewal.
However, while land reforms have liberated lower levels of government
to sell land and to generate revenue, they have not yet established a fully ma-
ture land market. Only government agencies can designate and then sell land
parcels, as the reforms have not awarded individual users of land the land-use
rights of the land they occupy. The private sector alone cannot buy up and re-
develop any land that it chooses: instead the government designates land to be
redeveloped and then invites development companies to collaborate in redevel-
oping parcels. Further, land-use rights are bought and sold through a process of
negotiation rather than open tender or auction, which allows considerable room
for corruption - for example, by public land being sold too cheaply because of
'under-the-table' payments to officials. In short, the full public benefits of market
efficiency that a mature land market would bring are not realized by the current
Chinese land market, which is dominated by government agencies and therefore
by political as much as market forces.
THE COMMODIFICATION OF HOUSING
As with land reforms, the commodification of housing began in response
to a specific problem. The Central Government quickly realized during the 1980s
that their increased expenditure on housing was expanding their financial burden,
as the maintenance and construction of housing was the state's responsibility as
a welfare provision. Paradoxically, the more housing they built, the greater the
fiscal burden of maintenance, and the more their capacity to build further would
decline as a result.
Accordingly, the government attempted to shift the burden of providing
housing to the lower levels of government and work-units and even ultimately to
real-estate developers. The latter would naturally only construct housing if they
were permitted to sell it for a profit, and so in effect the real estate industry was
established to shift the burden of construction on to actors who could make the
process financially viable or profitable. The growth in the number of real estate
companies has been staggering: there were just 12 nationwide in 1981, 2200 by
1986 and 7000 by 1990.7 This industry essentially acts as an engine for redevel-
opment by itself.
While initially work-units tended to construct housing for their employees,
a statute in 1998 forbade them to do so, and forced them to buy housing from
developers. Clearly, there were immense market efficiencies to be gained from
positioning work-units as 'customers' in a expanded market of developer-provid-
ed housing. In socio-spatial terms, these reforms have broken the former pattern
of self-contained developments based on individual work-units.
However, as with land reforms, the legalization of housing construction
has empowered lower levels of government and their associated companies and
work-units, rather than the populace as a whole. Most Beijing residents cannot
afford to buy housing on the open market, and an immature mortgage system
prevents them from gaining loans. In 1995, for example, less than 10% of resi-
dents owned their own housing.8 Most depend on their work-unit to provide hous-
ing for them, which leaves control of the housing market in the hands of govern-
ment-affiliated development companies and their work-units. Like land reform,
the housing market is immature, and much of the activity of both markets occurs
between different government agencies (or recently privatized companies) rather
than the private sector, leaving it open to manipulation by political pressures as
much as market forces.
DECENTRALIZATION
The Central Government's efforts to shift the burden of construction to low-
er levels of government was part of a general goal of decentralizing governance
in order to reduce their expenditure, which had been a priority since severe fiscal
deficits in the 1970s.9 Accordingly, both the Municipal and District-level Govern-
ments in Beijing were given substantially increased powers in return for taking on
the fiscal burden of managing their localities. Aside from sharing in Central Gov-
ernment taxes, the local levels of government were allowed and incentivized to
generate revenue locally in order to manage this burden. This incentive to raise
revenue has acted as dramatic spur to urban development, which is obviously a
major mechanism for generating funds.
In Beijing, decentralization has entrusted the Municipal Government with
responsibility for city-wide infrastructure, large-scale projects and overall su-
pervision of development in the city. The District Governments have taken on
responsibility for supervising individual projects and overall planning within their
domains. Arguably the decentralization of decision-making and tax-raising from
the municipal to the district governments has had an even greater impact on the
urban development that than that between the central and municipal govern-
ments. 10 Prior to these reforms, the district-level government was a peripheral
player in urban development; with both limited funding and decision-making
power." After the decentralization reforms, the District Governments in Beijing
and elsewhere came increasingly to become the most important actors in the de-
velopment process, as the agencies directly responsible for the implementation
of most urban development.
[Timeline
1953 Masterplan 'Learn Everything from the Soviet Union'
1958-9 Great Leap Forward
1966-76 Cultural Revolution
1978 Launch of Deng Xiaoping's 'Open Door Policy'
Fiscal deficits prompt start of decentralization and tax-sharing policies
1982 Reform of constitution establishes land-use rights
Beijing designated a 'cultural and political' center - no longer an industrial or
economic one
1988 Further legislation permits transfer of land-use rights, thus establishing land
market
1989 1989 City Planning Act legally switches planner's attention from industrial de-
velopment to urban development as a whole; cities are mandated to produce
comprehensive masterplans
1990 Acceleration of the ODHR program
7000 Real Estate companies in China
1992 Deng Xiaping's visit to the Southern cities and speeches calling for the reforms
to be accelerated
Beijing begins to lease land
1994 District Government's given greater control of ODHR projects
1998 Legislation prohibits work-units from constructing housing
Fig. 2.2: Chronology of Market Reforms and Urban Planning Legislation
2.4 THE ODHR PROGRAM
As mentioned earlier, the above reforms made inner-city redevelopment
economically viable for the first time. Hence, the Beijing Municipal Government
made a priority of addressing and improving inner-city living conditions, and
towards the end of the 80s the ODHR program was launched with the goal of
fulfilling the Communist Party aim of "...achieving a moderate level of well-be-
ing and obvious improvement in housing conditions for all Chinese by the end of
the century".2 By the end of 1993, 221 ODHR projects had been selected by the
Beijing Municipal Government involving 20.9 km2 in Old Beijing and a population
of approximately one million residents.13
The initial emphasis of the program was to improve living conditions for
residents with the most severely dilapidated living conditions by redeveloping
their housing and relocating them on-site. Hence, all of the initial parcels were
chosen because of their extreme dilapidated state, and as one of the develop-
ers of Xiao Hou Cang commented: "The policy of 'Each of the original house-
Fig. 2.3: The first designated phases of the ODHR Program
Fig. 2.4: The early ODHR projects - Dong Nan Yuan, Xiao Hou Cang and Ju'er -managed to
achieve high resident return rates and a contextual architectural style
holds will be allowed to move back' guaranteed the smooth evacuation of the
residents"." The designs for each of the first four pilot projects in different ways
evoked Old Beijing, and also achieved varying return rates from 100% in Xiao
Hou Cang and Dong Nan Yuan to 30% in the case of the Ju'er Hutong.15 In each
of the projects a small quantity of market housing or office space was constructed
to help balance costs.
However, by the time the ODHR program was expanded in the mid-1990s,
the nature of the program had changed. The rate of return of residents plum-
meted, as more and more residents were relocated away from their original loca-
tion into the suburbs (see fig. 2.5). Instead, the projects which were built in the
Old City tended to be high-end housing or commercial office or retail space. At a
meeting to discuss the progress of ODHR projects in 2000, only one project out
of ten was for residential, as opposed to commercial development.16 The basis
for the choice of parcels to be redeveloped increasingly came to be not their level
of dilapidation, but rather their location and latent land value. Officials concede
that the program no longer exists as it was originally conceived, which was as "a
program using preferential land allocation and tax policies to entice developers
to re-house inner-city residents, preferably on-site".17 Instead of a social welfare
program, it has become a large-scale urban renewal program to release land for
real estate development.
Rate of return of a sample of ODHR Projects, 1988-1995
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Ju'er 1988 0.8 0.21 44 9 1.31 0.276 0 9 30%
Chun Feng 1991 0.52 2.28 205 18 1.28 2 0.5 18 58%
De Bao 1991 0.67 5.2 996 24 1.92 6.76 3.2 24 62%
Hui Bai Shu 1991 0.46 11.41 1929 18 1.6 12 62 18 98%
Jin Tai Dong Li 1991 0.45 4.3 800 18 2.4 N/A N/A 18 60%
Tian Ning Si 1992 0.72 16 1812 24 1.55 18.3 8.8 36 40%
Niu Jie 1992 0.51 35.91 3000 24 2.97 37 43 65 90%
An Wai 1993 0.53 14.48 1861 45 3.08 0 0 45 0%
Jin Rong Jie 1993 0.47 103 5000 45 5.5 0 298.6 116 0%
Xuan Wai 1993 0.51 34 3000 45 5 35 135 50 30%
Chun Shu
Yuan 1994 0.43 16.2 1500 30 3.08 16.8 15.3 50 10%
Chong Wai 1994 0.57 4 1100 45 5 0 20 50 0%
Fig. 2.5: A survey of a selection of the early ODHR projects. Above, the declining percent-
age of residents returned in ODHR projects.
2.5 THE BALANCE OF POWER
Why did the ODHR program evolve the way it did? In large part the ex-
planation is that the program became dominated by the political objectives of
the local government, particularly after decentralization reforms gave the District
Governments greater power of approval over ODHR projects in 1994. These
objectives essentially determined that re-housing residents on-site became a less
desirable goal than redeveloping areas for their 'highest and best' use. The moti-
vation behind these political objectives is discussed in the next chapter.
Why in turn is urban development dominated by political objectives, and
not by, for example, urban planning policies? The answer to this essentially lies
in the balance of power. Urban plans in China are traditionally conceptualized by
politicians and only drawn up by planning professionals. As one planner memora-
bly put it: "Mayors do the planning and planners do the drawing'".' Another plan-
ner has put it even more bluntly: "We are not the decision-makers".19
Hence, whereas in the West planners attempt to mediate between spar-
ring interests, planners in Beijing (and China) tend to simply produce plans based
on decisions handed down from above. They tend not to act as 'regulators' of
urban development, because there is no institutional acknowledgment that the
interests of planners (and the public interest generally) might differ from those
of the local government or development companies' interests. The underlying
assumption is that all the players involved in urban development are all on the
same 'team' which is presumed to operate in the public interest.
With planners operating in a technical role, there is simply no mechanism
for recognizing the interests of those who planning might affect, because the
politicians are not accountable to an electorate and the planning process does
not involve participation from citizens and residents. The result is urban planning
decisions that often involve enormous social (and cultural) costs for which the
population affected have no institutional mechanism for registering their discon-
tent. While limited protests, lawsuits and media criticism of the redevelopment
process have occurred, they have rarely changed the redevelopment dynamic,
and the scope for these kind of actions is limited in what remains essentially an
authoritarian state. There is no possibility for the kind of 'rebellion' that occurred
in the US against urban renewal in the '60s because the political freedoms and
rights that exist in a democratic system do not exist in China.
2.6 THE BUREAUCRACY OF PLANNING
The context for redevelopment is further determined by the existing bu-
reaucracy of urban development. The absence of political reform has been ac-
companied by an absence of institutional reform, which has meant that the urban
development process is still impaired by a fractious bureaucracy.
This is perhaps most obvious in the actual design of physical environ-
ments, after plans have been conceptualized. The planning process tends to be
the sum result of a number of a different departments, rather than a coordinated,
unified effort to create a successful physical environment. Hence, infrastructure
regulations, for example, are enforced with little concern for the environment
they create. This has led to roads that are too wide to support any kind of vibrant
street life, and building setbacks that create an inconvenient and inhospitable
pedestrian environment. With regards to conservation, the failure to plan in inte-
grated fashion are even more hazardous: in the words of one observer "the traffic
engineer's view of the transportation network is more threatening to conservation
in Beijing than the developers".20 The failure to develop a successful mechanism
for installing integrated rather than separate pipes to upgrade hutongs is also a
severe threat: the separate pipes generally require a greater width than hutongs
generally are, necessitating their demolition if they are to be improved. The im-
pact of bureaucratic division could be seen on the planning of both case-study
areas examined later in the thesis.
2.7 IMPLICATIONS
How can we summarize the context for redevelopment, based on the
above reforms and 'constants' described above? Arguably urban development
can be seen in the current context of the wider Chinese political economy as
one that "utilizes market principles.. .but nonetheless emphasizes the continued
collectivization of the means of production". In other words, land and housing
reforms have brought a market orientation to development, but the process itself
remains dominated by government agencies. This domination by government
ultimately ensures that the redevelopment process itself will be driven by the
political objectives of the cadres, as the latter operate with almost no checks and
balances on their authority. Hence, understanding these objectives is the key to
grasping what drives and determines redevelopment.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
The context for redevelopment in Beijing does not by itself explain it. Just
because land and housing reforms enable the redevelopment process to be uti-
lized to relocate the maximum amount of residents possible and build commercial
or high-end residential buildings for profit, does not necessarily entail that rede-
velopment should almost always follows that pattern. After all, the early ODHR
projects utilized the market in order to achieve redevelopment that benefited the
residents. Why did projects like the Ju'er Hutong and Xiao Hou Cang never come
to be repeated?
One possible answer is that redevelopment in Beijing has followed a uni-
versal pattern of urban renewal, which other cities at different times and places
have implemented. Certainly, the impact of redevelopment in Beijing bears strik-
ing similarities to both the 'Haussmanization' of Paris in the 19 th century and ur-
ban renewal in US cities in the 1960s. In this view, the city leaders of Beijing are
responding to universally felt needs for central land for redevelopment for eco-
nomic development. This chapter explores how far this comparison can be taken,
particularly with regards to the forces driving urban renewal in other places.
A more specific answer to the above question, however, lies in under-
standing what drives the decision-makers. The unique Chinese party political
system places little value on cultural or social objectives. Economic develop-
ment is the only valuable political achievement. Hence, politicians are motivated
most by a need to advance (or appear to advance) the economic development
agenda. Hence, I will argue in this chapter that in urban redevelopment terms,
this means that politicians are keen to achieve economic development targets,
or increase their revenues base, or achieve visible redevelopment which can be
considered proof of economic advancement. Because excessive relocation or
damage to cultural heritage does not figure in this matrix, it is not considered a
serious problem. The personal enrichment of officials during the course of de-
velopment is also alleged to drive the process, and this is also discussed in this
chapter.
3.2 URBAN RENEWAL AND BEIJING
Can the redevelopment of Beijing be explained as part of a universal phe-
nomenon of urban renewal, rather than one situated in a specific time and place?
As mentioned earlier, urban redevelopment in Beijing bears a strong resem-
blance with the transformation of Paris in the 19 th century under Baron Hauss-
mann, when a medieval urban fabric was also redeveloped into 'modern' wide
avenues and buildings inhabited by commercial interests and wealthy residents.
Similarly, the urban renewal of many US cities in the '50s and '60s also bears
striking similarities with Beijing, as large amounts of land in inner cities occupied
by residents of a low socio-economic class were also turned over by the govern-
ment to developers for the purpose of developing supposedly 'higher and better'
uses on the land - generally commercial office space or luxury residential units.
It is striking that it is not only the results of redevelopment but also the
attitudes of officials that are similar. In the US, as in Beijing, urban renewal was
considered to be acceptable because it was assumed it would benefit all in the
long-run. One planner, Carol Aronovici of New York City, commented that "We
should quit trying to rehabilitate lower Manhattan for the poor and give it back
to the well-to-do by building expensive, luxurious and well-planned apartment
houses in which they could live close to the Financial District".' This mirrors the
attitude of officials in Beijing, who also believe that poor people should not be
living in inner city locations where land values are high.2 It was assumed in both
places that the poor would be much better off and happier with accommodation
with better facilities elsewhere. Their unhappiness at being uprooted was greeted
with apathy or disbelief. One US reformer wrote that he was ". ..astonished by the
intense grief of the uprooted residents.. .it is strange to find people so attached to
homes that were so lacking in all the attributes of comfort and decency". But if
the end-product of and justifications for urban renewal are comparable, can the
forces driving it in both places be compared?
Scholars have argued that urban renewal in the US was driven by a
'growth coalition' or 'growth regime' of different actors who coalesced around the
goal of redevelopment for different motivations.4 As historian Robert Fogelson
has written:
"Downtown business interests saw it as a way to lure the well-to-do from
the periphery to the center.. mayors viewed federal aid for redevelopment as
an opportunity to replace low-income slums and blighted areas with middle and
high income neighborhoods... that would alleviate the growing fiscal problem. City
planners viewed it as an opportunity to redesign the metropolis along more ef-
ficient lines..." 5
Does this 'growth coalition' have an equivalent in Beijing? At first glance
there does to be a similar corresponding phenomenon, as redevelopment is
promoted by an alliance of politicians keen to increase their revenue-base, de-
velopers keen to gain opportunities for profitable development, and planners and
designers keen to have the chance to design new areas. As in the US, those who
do not share this growth agenda - particularly the communities that are being
uprooted - are excluded from the redevelopment decision-making process.
These apparent similarities, however, mask enormous differences in the
political, economic and institutional environment between the two places. Where-
as urban renewal took place in the US in a mature market economy, redevelop-
ment in Beijing takes place in a transitional economy: at least 60% of the re-
sources of the economy are still state owned.6 Unlike in the US, where the private
sector was a driving force in passing the legislation that enabled urban renewal,
the role of private companies in redevelopment in Beijing is far more limited, and
for the most part the process is administered by District Governments and com-
panies either owned by or closely associated with them.
Just as importantly, the political environment in which renewal took place
in the US was vastly different than that in China. Urban renewal in the US was ul-
timately halted when the communities threatened with redevelopment found their
political and legal voice and successfully fought the coalition pushing renewal.
Despite nascent efforts to do the same in Beijing, communities essentially have
no official political or legal power in an undemocratic political system. Hence it
might be more apt to describe whatever forces are arrayed to advance redevel-
opment as a 'growth regime' rather than a 'growth coalition', as the latter seems
to imply a liberal society. In any case, however, urban redevelopment in Beijing
and China clearly takes place under unique circumstances, despite similarities
with renewal at other times and places, and must be fully explained on its own
terms.
3.3 GOVERNANCE IN BEIJING
Before describing the political motivations of the actors involved in urban
development, it is necessary to attempt to explain the complex structure of the
Beijing Government. There exist three levels of administration in the city: the
central, municipal and district-level governments. All of these levels have associ-
ated departments, work-units and commissions. For the most part, the Central
Government takes a hands-off approach towards urban development, limiting
their role to 'macro' legislation, high-profile projects, or developments where their
departments have a vested interest. The city is therefore generally run by the Mu-
nicipal Government, headed by the mayor, under whom nine vice-mayors serve,
and to whom in turn varying numbers of commissions report from a total of 34, of
which one is the Beijing Municipal Planning Commission. Beneath the Municipal
Government are 14 District Governments - including four in the Old City - each
headed by a governor, who controls a number of commissions, including a plan-
ning bureau.
As described in the previous chapter, tax-sharing policies and the decen-
tralization of decision-making authority have vastly increased the power of both
the Municipal and District levels of Government, and in the last decade the latter
has become particularly influential in shaping urban development. Hence, this
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clear structure does not necessarily represent the actual balance of influence
over development in Beijing, which has shifted steadily down the hierarchy since
1978. Further, District Governments can often form alliances with the Central
Government to 'leapfrog' the Municipal Government and subvert their policies.
The development of Finance Street, described in Chapter Four, largely followed
these lines.
Other factors also make governance and redevelopment in the city un-
predictable. The fact that the governance of the city depends a great deal on the
personalities involved is perhaps no surprise, given the traditional importance
of 'guanxi' (connections) in China. Beyond the influence of the web of personal
connections that dominates politics generally, different personalities often govern
in a fundamentally different way, and this can affect whether the higher levels of
government fully utilize their power or give the levels beneath them autonomy.
For example, according to one observer, Mayor Chen Xitong (1981-95) allowed
the District Governments comparatively little power; Mayor Liu Qi (1999-2003),
by contrast, allowed them far greater influence.7 To understand the governance of
the city, therefore, requires coming to grips with the complex interplay of institu-
tional actors and personalities involved.
3.4 DRIVING FACTORS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT
As politicians in China are appointed, rather than elected, they are ac-
countable only to higher levels of government rather than an electorate. Accord-
ingly their priorities are very different to those of electoral politicians. Under the
CCP political system, it is explicitly acknowledged that politicians are expected to
advance economic development, perhaps because the very legitimacy of Com-
munist Party is considered to depend on the success of the Party in advancing
the country's economic agenda. Consequently, the performance and careers of
politicians are measured almost exclusively in those terms. Hence, the principle
priority - if not requirement - of local government politicians is to demonstrate
economic growth, the accomplishment that is valued most by the higher levels
of government and most likely to increase their own power. Both Zhu Rongji and
Jiang Zemin, former Prime Minister and President of China respectively, were
promoted in part because of their performance as mayors of Shanghai in the
'80s. More recently the national role-model status of Shanghai has led to two of
its Municipal leaders Wu Bang-Guo and Huang Ju getting promoted to the central
government.8
There are perhaps three principal mechanisms for demonstrating eco-
nomic growth: attaining (or exceeding) economic targets, increasing the revenue
base, or achieving 'visible' development or redevelopment, which serves as
evidence of economic development. Redevelopment can serve more than one of
the goals simultaneously: widening roads, for example, is both a re-imaging politi-
cal achievement, but also may contribute to an economic target as it constitutes
the development of infrastructure.
Finally, the illicit personal enrichment of government officers through rede-
velopment has clearly also been a motivating factor of development, and is briefly
discussed in this section.
RE-IMAGING
The need for 'visible' development or redevelopment is felt by all levels of
the Chinese Government, for varying reasons. For individual politicians, such as
mayors or district governors, a limited term of office gives them only a short pe-
riod to 'make their mark', and the clear re-imaging of an area is one of the most
effective ways to demonstrate their competence to higher-level officials respon-
sible for their career advancement.9
For the actual government institutions themselves, re-imaging serves
subtly different purposes. For the District and Municipal Governments, re-imaged
areas offer an opportunity to market the city - or the district - as an 'international'
metropolis to domestic and foreign companies as part of a 'place promotion'
strategy. Two posters by the East District Government in Beijing, for example,
declare "We strive to build a world-class urban center" and "Establish an Interna-
tional District" respectively alongside pictures of modern developments in the Dis-
trict (see fig. 3.2). The use of English in these posters suggests that the District
Government is orienting its messages at an international audience, presumably
to boost foreign investment into the area.
Fig. 3.2: Redevelopment, imaging as a political goal: two East District posters. Above, a
graphic of the Oriental Plaza with the inscription "We strive to build a world-class urban
center" and below a graphic of a new areas with the inscription "Develop high-calibre
people of Dongcheng, Establish an international District"
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Fig. 3.3: Re-imaging as a political achievement: above, a poster that hangs in the West
District Planning Bureau offices. Below is a blow-up of before and after pictures of the
redeveloped Xidan area.
For the Central Government, re-imaging is critical for sending a message
to the world that the capital - like the country as a whole - is economically boom-
ing, modern and cosmopolitan. Notably, many of the major redevelopment proj-
ects of the 1990s were constructed in time for international events: Oriental Plaza
and the widened Ping-An Avenue were both ready for the 5 0 th anniversary of the
founding of the People's Republic celebrations in 1999, which were broadcast
world-wide. A similar array of redevelopment projects is scheduled to be ready for
the Olympics in 2008, including Dashilan and the Olympic Complex in the north
of the city.
The result of this need to re-image, however, is that the city tends to place
its resources in projects that are perceived to have the greatest political impact,
rather than those that are necessarily what the city needs. Hence the city invest-
ed 20.3B$ in the widening of Ping'An Avenue, while many areas of the Old City
still do not have basic sewage pipes and other infrastructure. According to one
commentator, the East-West Avenue in Shenzhen served little practical purpose
but to re-image the city; other, less glamorous issues such as affordable housing
were left on the sidelines.10 Then Vice-Premier Wen Jiaobao even warned mu-
nicipal leaders against this tendency in a speech in 2001, commenting that city
leaders should "... guard against going in for grandiose projects or showy but not
useful projects. It is necessary to avoid building high-rise buildings, broad av-
enues and large squares in a blind manner".
ECONOMIC TARGETS
In large part, the appeal of 're-imaging' is that it offers apparently unmis-
takable evidence of economic advancement. This advancement is also measured
in other ways, particularly in a series of 'economic targets' which both Municipal
and District Governments are expected to reach, as it is politically embarrass-
ing to fall short of them. Hence criteria such as 'quantity of dilapidated housing
to demolish', or 'District GDP' to attain generally determine the nature of urban
development which is carried out. These targets are generally the index by which
the performance of local government and its officials are measured.
For the District Governments, the result is that "(they) don't care about
their people. Economic growth for the district is only standard by which their
performance is judged. (So) they want tangible results".12 Frequently, the need
to reach economic targets is used as a bargaining tool by district government
officials to get projects approved. As one expert put it: "The District Governor
will say: if you demand an 8% increase in economic development for my district,
then you should approve some of the projects that my district would like to do."13
Again, this kind of approach does not favor conservation: "Cultural and historical
aspects become the last priority when the district needs to increase the income
level of the population, the financial capital etc." 14
INCREASING REVENUES
As described in the previous chapter, decentralization reforms which de-
volved control over urban redevelopment to lower levels of government have also
incentivised them to increase their revenue base and power.15
Unlike in fully developed market economies, however, the principal mech-
anism for collecting revenue in Beijing is not a mature Municipal tax system, as
in cities in the West. The Municipal Government would be unwilling to impose
one, at least in part because any municipal-wide taxes would need to be shared
with the Central Government, with a resulting loss in 'local wealth'.16 Instead, the
main source of municipal revenue is land-leasing and land-use fees.17 In 1995
and 1996, for example, the Beijing City Government earned 445.8 and 385.5M$
respectively from land-leasing, approximately 20% of the city's total income of
1.8B$. Many other cities receive as much as 50% of their revenue from land-
leasing fees.1 3
The need for District-level Governments in particular to increase their
revenue base explains in part why so much of the redevelopment of Old Beijing
has centered around commercial, rather than resident development. There is
obviously a vast difference in the income raised by the former over the latter. The
benefit to a District Government of developing commercial sectors is demonstrat-
ed in the West District, whose banking sector - mainly centered in the Finance
Street development discussed in Chapter Four - was the major component of a
banking industry which added 5.47B yuan (equivalent to about US$500 million) to
the economy, accounting for 52.1% of the gross domestic product of the district.19
The local governments also gain a form of 'revenue in-kind' by asking de-
velopers of land parcels to contribute an infrastructure fee or to actually construct
infrastructure on their behalf, generally in lieu of a higher land cost. The devel-
oper of the De-Wai area, for example, had to construct a large highway through
the site in exchange for the right to build there.20
There are, however, inherent flaws in developer-provided infrastructure.
The latter tends to encourage developers to seek sharp increases in the FAR and
size of projects, as they naturally seek as much profit as possible to amortize the
construction costs of providing infrastructure. This not only makes the develop-
ment of small-scale development financially unviable - because of the disecon-
omy of servicing a smaller site - but also encourages a 'splintered city' in which
only the wealthy areas of the city have access to modern infrastructure. Further,
local governments have come to see large-scale projects as the only mechanism
for getting infrastructure built, and the drawing up of urban renewal parcels by the
Municipal Planning Institute - and urban redevelopment itself - is often explicitly
geared towards this end.21
CORRUPTION
The personal enrichment of government officers as a driving force for
redevelopment cannot be ignored, even if for obvious reasons it cannot be ad-
equately researched. One commentator has described the situation as follows:
"There's a saying in Beijing: as soon as you get a project, you're rich. That's not
because you're rich because you've developed a project and sold the units, but
you're actually becoming rich in the process of developing property and spending
the bank's money". 22 On a similar note, one journalist has recounted the follow-
ing:
"The 'cai qian' (dismantling and relocation) process is completely corrupt,"
said an expert on who is familiar with the process." The government comes in
with this 'wei-gai' (reform of dangerous buildings) policy in the name of upgrading
your living condition. In fact this is an excuse to move people out. The Olympics
will provide a huge incentive for this because the Central Government will give
the Beijing Government huge amounts of money to beautify the city," he said.
District Governments set up shell development companies which are awarded
bids and pay residents as little compensation as possible, splitting the profit with
district officials, the expert and residents said."23
This kind of activity is almost impossible to prove. However, there is sub-
stantial anecdotal evidence that the cost of construction frequently includes a fee
to local officials that facilitates 'getting the land cheap'.24 Certainly, revenue from
land-leasing has been found on occasion to be far lower than expected "due to
illegal transfers or 'under the table' deals by local officials". 25 On a few rare occa-
sions, municipal officials are brought to justice on corruption charges, none more
famously than former Mayor Chen Xitong, who was jailed for 16 years in April of
1995 for receiving 25M$ in kickbacks from Li Ka-Shing during the development
of Oriental Plaza. 26 A total lack of transparency and absence of decision-making
supervision has clearly created room for abuse.
3.5 DRIVING FACTORS FOR DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES
If the politicians of local government are driven by political concerns, what
drives the development companies who for the most part implement redevelop-
ment? Like everywhere else, developers in Beijing are motivated in part by the
need to make a profit. By unlike in other places, Beijing development companies
are often driven by the same political objectives as the government.
This is because most developers in Beijing are not genuine private sector
companies but are either state-owned enterprises (SOE's) or have only become
recently privatized while still maintaining close links with their former parent. In
1995, for example, nearly all the property development companies in the city
were controlled by one or other level of government and "none could be consid-
ered as truly a private sector firm".27 Even for wholly private-sector developers,
institutional support from local government is critical, and these companies are
therefore understandably anxious to comply with the District or Municipal Gov-
ernment needs.28 In practice therefore, Beijing development companies tend to
combine a profit-making motivation with a need to fulfill the local government's
political goals.
In return for fulfilling these goals, Beijing development companies receive
a large number of benefits that a true private sector firm would not. Those com-
panies that are still partly or wholly state-owned are kept under what has been
termed a 'soft-budget constraint' which allows them to make losses and still
remain in business, sheltered from 'true' market conditions. Most Beijing devel-
opment companies typically receive land for free or at a highly subsidized cost,
rarely paying the full market price. They tend to have easy access to bank loans
awarded by government agencies whose discretionary power is guided "not by
financial accountability but by government policies".29 Hence, the disincentive of
a financially unsuccessful project that a private sector firm would respond to does
not exist to the same degree for a government-owned or affiliated developer.
The result is that the economic model that these companies operate with
is very different than a typical development company. Whereas the latter is fo-
cused on keeping its costs down and being able to market the end-product which
is constructed, a Beijing development company may spend its budget without a
primary concern for whether the development as a whole will be profitable. This
means that they are prepared to take on projects that may not in themselves be
profitable, but instead fulfill the objectives of the government agency which has
commissioned the project. One planner has recounted a typical episode:
"The district wanted to use the shopping street to earn back some of the
income that will be made from the shops. / spoke to the district chief and asked
what would he do if they are unable to sell the buildings along the pedestrian
street. The district chief said they will just give them back to Commercial Bank
that loaned them the money in the first place. What use does the bank have for
these buildings? The DG is irresponsible.'"0
While development companies may take on a project because of political
pressure, they are nevertheless almost entirely profit-motivated in the implemen-
tation of development. This has led them to relocate as many residents as pos-
sible in every site developed, since the more residents relocated, the more space
available for developing more profitable commodity housing or office space. As
one commentator commented in 1997:
"..for every square meter of suburban housing the development company
buys to compensate relocated households, it can still make a profit of RMB 2000
by selling commodity housing in the Old City neighborhood."
Hence, because the need to re-house residents on-site is a low political
priority for local government, developers are free to redevelop in the way that
makes them the most profit, providing they fulfill the government's economic
development agenda described above. This perhaps explains how the majority of
ODHR developments came to be characterized by the relocating as many of the
original residents as possible, and constructing the most profitable types of build-
ings in their stead.
At worst therefore, the development companies do not act in either an
exclusively public or profit-making interest: simultaneously relocating as many
residents as possible in order to maximize profits, but doing so in the construction
of a project that may be politically instigated, rather than market-demanded, and
therefore not necessarily successful on completion. This perhaps explains why
there was a high vacancy rate for luxury apartments and commercial office space
throughout the 1990's; they were being constructed by companies operating at
the instigation of politicians without the disincentive of financial failure."
Of course, there are development companies in Beijing who are exclu-
sively profit-oriented, and far less constrained by the political objectives of local
government. However, these companies have tended to develop more market-
friendly sites outside the Old city - such as the Jianguomen CBD - where traffic
access is better and there is close proximity to amenities. Indeed the bulk of
foreign investment in real estate development in Beijing tends to be directed to
to the suburbs of the city.33 On the occasions when wholly private companie are
involved in redevelopment in the Old City, they tend to partner government af-
filiated developers and usually only participate in redevelopment at a late stage
- when land has been cleared and residents relocated - when they then buy land
from their development companies partners at a market price. For the most part,
therefore, redevelopment in the Old City has been orchestrated and managed by
local government and affiliated development companies sharing their goals.
3.6 PLANNING VS. POLITICS
The impact of a redevelopment process dominated by the local govern-
ment's political objectives is that the 'legitimate' objectives of urban planning
professionals are frequently overridden. Even policies mandated by the Municipal
Planning Commission and approved by the Municipal Government, are frequent-
ly overridden by the District Government (often with the support of the Municipal
Government) as they simply have no legal or regulatory weight. As discussed in
the previous chapter, the politicians are the decision-makers in urban develop-
ment, and the only possible curb on their activities is the obscure threat of sanc-
tion from a higher level of government. Any conflict between the objectives of
planners and politicians is therefore invariably resolved in the latter's favor, and
the tension between planners and politicians is essentially the crux of the two
case-studies discussed in the next chapters.
Certainly, examples of sensible planning policies being overridden by
District and Municipal-level politicians are numerous. The next chapter explores
how the Municipal Government approved the development of Finance Street, a
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development of the 'real' CBD outside the outside the Old City. Similarly, Chapter
Five explores how the Municipal Planning Commission's '25 Conservation Areas'
policy, again approved by the Municipal Government, was breached in Nanchizi,
when instead of a gradual, 'organic' conservation the area was redeveloped in
a wholesale fashion. As Wu Liangyong has concluded, the current weakness of
planning regulation ensures that "...developments motivated by local interests will
contradict and conflict with the interests of the city as a whole".
Nor are the 'micro' guidelines any more successful. The height limit policy
in the Old City aimed at maintaining the historic prominence of the Forbidden City
and other monuments in Old Beijing has repeatedly been overridden. If a devel-
oper has 'access' to the right politician, he can usually be assured of breaking
the existing policy. As one planner commented: "Developers can simply bypass
the Planning Commission and go straight to the mayor"." Naturally, it cannot be
assumed that politicians will always make decisions based on short-term political
or economic interest. However, the current system ensures that too much dis-
cretionary authority to do so is placed in the hands of individuals and the 'guanxi'
system.
The confluence of the role of personalities, the need for political achieve-
ments and disregard for planning policies can be seen in the development of the
Oriental Plaza. The development involved the demolition of some of the finest
courtyard homes in Beijing as well as some of its most famous cultural and com-
mercial institutions (including the world's largest McDonalds). They were replaced
by a 1/2 km super block development which at 68m exceeded the height restric-
tions of the Master plan by some 38m. Yet the project was actually spearheaded
by then Mayor Chen Xitong, who had hawked the land to developer Li Ka-Shing
on an investment mission in Hong Kong in 1992. Clearly the development was
consistent with the Mayor's vision of Beijing as a modern international metropo-
lis, despite (or because of) its breach of his organization's planning regulations.
Naturally the afore-mentioned 25M$ that Chen Xitong and his associates were al-
leged to have received may also have been a factor in his propelling the project.
3.7 RESIDENTS
If planners have limited powers in the development process, residents and
communities generally are almost entirely shut out of the redevelopment deci-
sion-making process. The assumption is that the politicians will manage rede-
velopment in the best interests of all. However, as this thesis has argued, the
economic development objective that is the main motivation of politicians - which
in the '90s has generally resulted in the relocation of residents during the rede-
velopment process - arguably conflicts with the resident's best interests.
The relocation procedure alone raises substantial doubts over whether
politicians can credibly claim to be acting for the public. While residents whose
homes are to be demolished are legally entitled to stay in their homes until com-
pensation has been agreed, in practice, they are intimidated if they show any
reluctance to move whatsoever. The following account, reported in a newspaper,
is probably typical:
"One young man who had complained about his compensation said he
was beaten three times by thugs hired by the developers... (Another resident)
Wang, who is from Donghuashi where residents in 250 households were ordered
to move, said she and her sister were beaten with sticks by a group of men alleg-
edly hired by the developer... "36
There is almost nothing that residents can do in the face of this kind of
treatment. As one resident commented: "We're afraid to sue them. They told us
they have connections from the district director down to the police, procuratorate
and the courts". Until there is genuine political and legal reform, residents will be
powerless to oppose policies that are detrimental to them.
3.8 A GROWTH MACHINE IN BEIJING
To what extent can redevelopment be said to be driven by a 'growth re-
gime', as discussed at the beginning of the chapter?
Clearly there is a regime of actors in Beijing who have coalesced around
the goal of redevelopment. This regime is, however, significantly different from
its counterpart in the US and other mature market economies. The most critical
difference is arguably that the Beijing 'growth regime' is almost exclusively gov-
ernment dominated. Whereas the private sector played a critical role in pushing
urban renewal in the US, its role is substantially less prominent in Beijing, where
redevelopment is for the most part driven by differing levels of government and
companies they control or heavily influence.
This in turn means that the regime in Beijing is driven by a far narrower set
of objectives than in other places, and these center primarily on the interests of
politicians. These in turn consist largely of the promotion of what could be termed
politically visible economic growth - of the kind that provides political benefits to
its sponsors. This kind of growth is not necessarily motivated by profits, and is
not evenly necessarily genuine economic growth.
By contrast, urban renewal in the West was driven by a far broader ar-
ray of actors and motivations. Politicians sought political benefits from renewal,
defined in electoral terms. Developers sought opportunities to make a profit. The
private sector wanted to a wealthier populace patronizing their shops and servic-
es in the city center. When these benefits became questionable - when renewal
became unpopular with the electorate, or unprofitable, or even legally unsus-
tainable, it stopped. The far more limited nature of the regime in Beijing means
that it far easier to satisfy the agenda of its participants, since politically visible
growth is a goal not dependent on the profitability, popularity or legality of rede-
velopment. In other words, the growth regime in Beijing is far less constrained
than that which has existed elsewhere, and this perhaps explains the dramatic
speed and extent of redevelopment within Old Beijing. In any case, the next two
chapters will test both this framework and the general proposition that urban
development is dominated by political objectives against two specific instances
of redevelopment: the development of a business district, Finance Street, and a
conservation project, Nanchizi.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of this thesis, three principal criticisms of redevelopment
in Beijing were identified: too much destruction of the historic urban fabric, 'inap-
propriate' construction replacing it and 'too many' residents relocated. All of these
criticisms seem particularly relevant to the development of Finance Street, a 105
hectare development intended as a financial management zone in the Xicheng
District of the Old City at Fuxingmen Gate (see fig. 4.1) Firstly, the development
has involved the relocation of almost 15,000 residents to date, with 30,000 more
to go when the second phase of construction finishes in 2005. Almost none of the
previous residents of the area will be able to live in the new development. Sec-
ond, there has been minimal architectural
conservation of what was a historically
significant area: only a portion of the pre-
viously existing trees, a temple and a few
select siheyuan have been retained. Fi- JinRon;J e
nally, the completed buildings have been
widely criticized for their architectural
style, scale and overall urban design.1
This chapter seeks to explain
how and why the development was built,
despite being in contravention of both the
Fig. 4.1: Location of Beijing FinanceMunicipal Master plan and height regula- Street
Fig. 4.2: The redevelopment of the Finance Street area. Before (above) and after (below)
tions. The proposition put forward in the previous chapters - that urban develop-
ment is determined primarily by political objectives rather than cultural, social or
urban planning considerations- is tested with this case-study. Finally, the chapter
aims to explain the urban design of the development, analyzing both the inten-
tions of the development company and the institutional environment in which the
development was planned.
4.2 BACKGROUND
According to the volume published by the developers, the concept of
Finance Street was conceived by the Xicheng (West District) Government after
Deng Xiaoping's visit to the Southern Chinese cities in 1992, when he called
for the acceleration of the reforms and open-door policy.2 Consequently, the
District Government developed a policy known as "prospering Xidan, develop-
ing Xicheng", a part of which became to develop Finance Street, an area which
would serve as a Finance Services Center. On June 10 th 1992 the Xicheng gov-
ernment setup a 'supervision office' for the construction of the area, and in De-
cember of that year the 'Beijing Construction and Development Corporation of
Beijing Finance Street' was established, the company which was to become the
main real-estate holding company for the entire development. The development
would be constructed in a number of different phases, the first of which would be
between 1994-98.
Importantly, no mention of a possible 'Finance Street' - or commercial
function - was made in the Municipal Government's 1991 Master plan for the city.
Instead, the plan had directed the majority of commercial activity to a designated
4 km2 CBD at Chaoyang Gate. Placing the nucleus of commercial activity outside
the Old City made excellent sense from a number of perspectives. The infrastruc-
ture of the Old City - particularly the roads - would be inadequate for a financial
center. More importantly, the damage to the historic fabric of the Old City by
locating a CBD there would be tremendous. By contrast, the site selected by the
Municipal City Planning Commission for the CBD in Chaoyang was outside the
Old City, close to the airport, and over 70 foreign embassies and companies had
already been established there.3
However, the location of the CBD to the east of the Old City essentially cut
out the West District from much of the planned commercial activity of the city.
Naturally, the West District had every motivation to seek to further the develop-
ment of their district, both in terms of reshaping the district's image and in in-
creasing economic development and revenues. The Finance Street development
would later be described as a key project in the strategy of "prospering Xidan,
developing Xicheng" which had "great significance for the economic development
of the Xicheng district".4 Accordingly, it was designated as a key project in the
District, and its development schedule was accelerated.
The District Government was able to circumvent the Master plan of the
Municipal Planning Commission in large part because of an alliance with three
Central Banks - the Bank of China, the People's Insurance Company of China,
and the People's Bank of China - who were already located in the area and did
not want to move. The Bank of China had been the first to locate in this area, and
as a national-level agency had had considerable autonomy in choosing a location
for its offices. 5 Arguably, the proximity of the Finance Street area to the admin-
istrative center of power around Tiananmen and the prestige of a central Beijing
location were more important to them than contact with foreign organizations
and the airport. In any case, the develop-
ment company and District Government
was thus to able to claim that these three
companies represented "...the embryo of
the Financial Management Center". Addi-
tionally, other Central Government banking
departments expressed a desire to move
close to these other banks, and as these
organizations had the funds available to
redevelop the site, they offered the pros- E
pect of a politically valuable transformation
of an 'old' area at no cost to the District or
Municipal Government.6 In any case, the
banks and the District Government were
able to secure Central Government support
for the creation of Finance Street, and in
Fig 4.3: The Bank of China (above) andOctober 1993 the State Council approved the People's Bank of China (below)
the establishing of a 'Financial Management Center' from Fuxingmen Gate to
Fuchengmen Gate.7 The Municipal Planning Commission had no choice but to
adjust its master plan to incorporate Finance Street.
Aware of the appearance of arbitrariness in the choice of the location, the
development company was keen to justify the choice of site as a CBD by sug-
gesting the area had historically been a banking area. 8 The Development Com-
pany's volume claims that Finance Street was the location for 'Jincheng Lane'
(Gold City Lane), where there had once been gold and silver workshops with
"merchants, plutocrats and royal members coming and going.. .to make a good
fortune". The company also claim that at the end of the Qing dynasty, a number
of banking institutions - such as the Bank of Great Xing (later renamed the Bank
of China) were located there. The development company and the District claimed
that the idea was that Finance Street would be specifically a banking Street, a
Chinese version of Manhattan's Wall Street, rather than a competitor for the Cha-
oyang district CBD.
This claim, as well as the historical roots of the site did not, however, con-
vince critics of the merits of the location. Even aside from the immense damage
to the prospects of conservation for the Old City - akin according to some critics
to the decision in the 1950s to situate the administrative center in the Old City
- many argued that the choice of location was a poor one.9 Critics argued that
the 'real' CBD would be harmed by the development of a rival location across
town; that there would be insufficient infrastructure and amenities in the location;
and that there was insufficient space for expansion of the location to turn it into a
real CBD. These criticisms will be explored further later in this chapter.
4.3 DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
After being ratified by the State Council, the Xicheng Government pro-
ceeded with plans for the development of the area. The development process
itself would be managed by the wholly-owned subsidiary, the 'Construction and
Development Corporation of Beijing Finance Street' which was established in
1992. In 1998 the company was reorganized and renamed as the Beijing Fi-
nance Street Corporation (BFSC), and in 2000 the company went public and was
listed on the Shenzhen stock market, although as much as 60% of the shares in
the company are still owned by the District Government. According to the devel-
opment company, this combination of market and state-ownership offers the best
of both worlds: ensuring that the company does not always act in a profit-seeking
manner, while ensuring its better management as a result of being a listed public
company.10
The District Government transferred the land use rights to BFSC, who in
turn sold these rights to individual development companies. The developers of
each parcel thus paid two charges: a land-use rights fee which was paid directly
to the government, and a 'land development fee' to cover the costs of the demoli-
tion and relocation of the neighborhood, as well as the infrastructure of the area.
This development fee varied according to the size and nature of the individual
project.
In the first phase of the development, the company designated parcels
for development which were then sold to developers, who then proceeded to
construct buildings on them. BFSC was responsible for the overall planning and
infrastructure of the area, including the landscaping. The company commissioned
the Beijing Municipal Planning Institute to produce a master plan for the site in
October 1993, and the subsequent plan was approved by the Capital Planning
and Construction Committee. The detailed Construction Plan was further devel-
oped in February 1994, and in the first phase of the project (1994-99), 11 projects
were constructed, totaling 780000m 2.
Timeline
1992 Beijing Finance Street Construction and Development Corporation Ltd.
set up
1993 First Master plan for Finance Street
1993 Finance Street Plans approved by State Council
October Detailed Planning of Beijing Finance Street was worked out by Beijing
1993 Planning Design Institute
Approved by the Capital Planning Commission
Feb 1994 Detailed Construction Plans approved
1994-2000 830 000 m2 built
1998 Company reorganized and renamed
1998 Occupancy rate 100%
2000 Design Competition held, revision of Master plan
2000 Finance Street Construction and Development Company goes Public
2000 Competition held for design of 2nd phase of FS, SOM wins
2005 2 nd phase of Finance Street scheduled to be complete
Fig. 4.4: Timeline of construction of Finance Street
As mentioned earlier, on the existing site for the development of Finance
Street was a traditional Beijing urban fabric of hutongs and siheyuan. There is no
question that the area was considered to be of considerable historic and cultural
value, despite the presence - as in historic areas throughout the city - of dilapi-
dated housing." The development company would claim that of the 28,000 hous-
es in the area, 78% were in the Ministry of Construction class of 3 or 4 which the
company claimed, inaccurately, were the 'danger' categories. 12 In fact, there is
Fig. 4.5: Map of relocation areas in relation to Jin Rong Jie
every reason to be skeptical of this estimate: in similar cases of areas that been
selected for redevelopment, officials would exaggerate the extent of dilapidation
to justify demolition, particularly as according to Municipal regulations a minimum
of 70% of the housing had to be in condition class 3 or below for redevelopment
to occur.13 In the development volume, the company included several pictures
of poor quality housing from the area prior to the development, although notably
also included some pictures of some of the areas in better condition and of obvi-
ous historic and cultural merit, perhaps because it would have been far-fetched
to suggest that the area consisted entirely of slum-like conditions.
The presence of dilapidated housing in the area would enable the District
Government to seek to accomplish two important political goals with the devel-
opment: to not only establish a new, modern CBD in the District, but also to be
able to claim to have improved the living standards of the existing residents. As
would become the ubiquitous practice in Beijing in the '90s, this 'improvement'
would entail relocation off-site. In all, 16700 families comprised of 46000 people
would be relocated in the course of the development, generally to the relocation
areas in Da Hong Men Xima Chang and Hui Long Guan, the former of which
was approximately 30km away from the development site (see fig. 4.4). In its
volume about the development, BFSC took pains to establish the legitimacy of
the relocation: "As required by the General Urban Planning of Beijing" writes the
company "the area of Beijing Finance Street is defined as the area for offices of
financial business. Most buildings here are public constructions. Therefore it has
(been) decided that residents in the existing one-story houses be moved out".
The company would claim that in the course of relocation, residents living
area per capita would be doubled and their living conditions would be "greatly
improved" to realize "the wish of the government to improve people's living condi-
tion through the project". As described in Chapter One, it is at best ambiguous
to suggest that an increase in living space and better facilities coupled with relo-
cation to a distant location with inadequate amenities represents a comprehen-
sive improvement in overall quality of life, and studies of comparable relocations
suggest that many residents feel they were worse off than before.
4.4 PRESERVATION
The main aspects of preservation in the development zone were of
Duchenghuang temple in Plot G and Mosque in Plot E, both of which were re-
constructed in different places from their original location.15 With regards to the
Mosque, the development company commented that: "One of the four existing
mosques, although being repaired, is still in a somewhat bad condition. Then on
the suggestion that religious beliefs be respected and history be extended, it has
been decided to reconstruct the mosque to obtain the effect much different from
maintaining the existing one".
Similarly, 59 trees were 'preserved', although generally by moving the
trees from their original location. BFSC claimed to follow the principle of "Preser-
vation comes first, transplantation second" as well as "trying to transplant instead
of cutting, trying to cut less instead of more".16 Whether any of this could be
considered preservation rather than a minimal effort at retaining those features
of the site which might actually add an environmental or cultural amenity for the
bankers and businessman who would use the completed development is open to
question.
4.5 URBAN DESIGN: DEVELOPERS INTENTIONS
According to Vale and others, urban design is not a value-neutral aes-
thetic, but an integral part of the motives driving a particular development. This is
undoubtedly the case with Finance Street, and there is no need to speculate as
to the development company's intentions because they explicitly and expansively
explain their design intentions in their volume.
According to the brief, the design of buildings on Finance Street was to be
of the "spirit of the age, the national style, and the local accent". In other words,
the buildings were to be designed both to reflect the image of a modern capital
in the spirit of Deng's reform era, but also to be consistent with the ancient style
of the capital. Hence the development company states that "Beijing Finance
Street will keep up the rhythm of history" through its design yet at the same time
be a building complex that "stand(s) for the spirit of the time.. .full of the modern
flavor"." Additionally, each building would send out an appropriate message that
was consistent with how its sponsor wished to be perceived.
It is abundantly clear therefore that both the district and the city wanted to
send a clear message to the world with Finance Street that Beijing was reforming
into a modern, service-oriented, booming metropolis. The architecture is there-
fore frequently described in the development volume as being "fresh" or creating
a "fresh landscape" - thus signaling a clear break from the Mao and industry-
dominated past. "The policy of reform and opening gives the motive for the devel-
opment of Finance Street" writes the development company "As a product of the
age, Finance Street's environment should be the frontier, effusive in the strong
spirits and senses of the modern age". Hence, the east-west axis of Finance
Street "stands for the symbolic meaning of being open, as influenced by the spirit
of the age of 'reform and opening to the world"'. Similarly, the single buildings on
Finance Street "embody power and solidity" as gradually Beijing is appearing "as
a modern city, brimming with power".18
At the same time as sending a message of modernity and power, the de-
velopment company also wished to communicate through the design both stabil-
ity and solemnity, in keeping with Beijing's status as the capital. This dual desire
is expressed in the way the development company wish Finance Street to appear
at night: "Another symbolic point of a modern city is to create an entirely fresh
view of the landscape against the background of darkness. In order to let Beijing
Finance Street shine more brilliantly and harmonious in the night scene of the
Fig. 4.6: Left, the China Construction Bank Tower, right 'golden' flowers as part of
the landscaping on Finance Street
capital, the landscape should be planned as a whole.. .the style of the night scene
should keep to the theme of solemnity, harmony and modernity, being not only
brilliant, but impressive; not only splendid, but steady so as to form a passionate
and prosperous pattern without being noisy and secular".19 Perhaps unstated is
the 'look' that the city is not trying to achieve - that of Hong Kong or Shenzhen,
with their city images of chaotic and decadent capitalism.
While symbolizing the modernity of the area (and by extension the District and
the city) and their break with the Chinese past, the development company also
attempted to ensure the design of Finance Street fitted in with its cultural context.
This would be achieved in the design of individual buildings. For example the Fi-
nance-Culture Mall on Jin Shi Fang Jie Street was to "echo with the White Tower
in Maoying Temple" which would enable "...people, living amid the skyscrapers,
to trace back to the market on Jinshifangjie". Similarly, the Tong Tai building's
main facade was "...derived from the Ancient Ornamental Column to make the
building in harmony with the Ancient City", while the China Construction Bank
was inspired by an "ancient bronze tripod of the Shang dynasty". Additionally, the
30m greenbelt along the position of the Old City Wall would act "as the symbol
standing for the old address of the City Wall".
If the desire to create a new landscape that would impress the world
with Beijing's modernity on the one hand and be compatible with the Ancient
City and the solemn capital on the other were the political goals of the design,
more traditionally developer-oriented concerns were also reflected in the de-
sign of the street. Again, these were explicitly acknowledged. For example, the
greenbelt was designed "in order to provide an ideal working environment for
investors". This entailed "inviting experts in horticulture for detailed design and
construction... instead of the routine handing over of the land directly to (the)
Urban Garden Greening Department.. .".21 This was taken to somewhat absurd
lengths when even the color of the flowers in the greenbelt were supposed to
symbolize the Finance nature of the street: "in order to highlight the specialty of
the area and the topic of 'Jin Rong' (Finance) the selection of plant materials is
closely related to the character 'Jin' (meaning gold)". This entailed a selection of
'golden' flowers, including golden bells, yellow Chinese Roses and so forth.
At the same time, individual buildings were designed to reflect how their
NAME OF BUILDING DEVELOPER DESIGNER FLOOR HEIGHT DATE OF CON- CODE
SPACE _ STRI UTION
Jin Yang Mansion Beijing Finance Street Construction and Devel- Architectural Institute of the Ministry of Construction 73000m2 31.9m 1994-7 G I
opment Corporation Ltd.
Beijing JIng Dian Real Estate Development
Corporatinn
China Construction Bank China Constuction Bank Hong Kong TaoHo Design Partnership Architects 73000m2 70m 1995-8 Cl
Tower Reijing Architectnral Design and Research Institute_
Ping'An Plaza China Ping'An Insurance Corporation Beijing Kaidike Building and Design Corporation Ltd. 56000m2 55m C2
Navy Design Tnstitute_
Investment Plaza Beijing Xin Xie Real Estate Development Beijing Kaidike Building and Design Corporation Ltd. 63000m2 70m 1995-8 C4
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China Telecom Center / General Bureau of China Post & Telecommu- Architectural Design Research Institute of Shanghai Tongji I 16000m2 78.8m 1998- C5
Finance Tower nications University
Beijing Ying Sheng Real Estate Development
Co I td
Tong Tai Mansion Beijing Jin Tong Tai Real Estate Development Hong Kong Zhong Hua Nan I 15000m2 68.7m 1994-8 C6
CO. I td. Design Office of China Building Science Research Institute
Corporate Square Beijing Ming Hua Property Development Co. Smallwood, Reynolds, Stewart and Stewart and Associates I 1OOOOm2 60.6m 1994-8 C7
of USA
DP Architects of Singapore
Beijing Parkson Plaza Lion Group Malaysia China National Arts and Urban Architectural Institute of Ministry of Construction 60000m2 50.9 1996-8 C8
Crafts Cnrpnratinn Reijing Hni Yu I Trhan Consiniction Center
Jin Long Apartment Beijing Finance Street Construction & Develop- Beijing Architectural Design Institute 140000m2 30-35m 1999-02 G2
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Xicheng District Frlonglu Road Office
Jin Ya Guang Mansion / Beijing Sunlight (Yang Guang) Real Estate Beijing Architectural Design Institute 188000m2 80.6m 1999-2001 A3
Jin Cheng Yuan Development Co. Cai En Group
Beijing Finance Street Construction and Devel-
opnent Co
Fig. 4.7: The Buildings of Finance Street
China Construction Bank Investment Plaza (C4)
Tower (C1)
Tong Tai Mansion (C6) Corporate Square (C7) China Telecom Center / Beijing Parkson Plaza Jin Yang Mansion (G1)
Finance Tower (C5) (C8)
I I
Fig. 4.8: The 2001 Master plan of Finance Street
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sponsors wished to come across. The China Construction Bank Tower was
designed to contribute to the skyline by being "grand, magnificent and substan-
tially impressive with its deep rooted cultural touch and lofty taste.. .which corre-
sponds to the bank's pursuit of steadiness, prudential operation and credibility as
a state-owned bank."22 The latter comment is ironic, given the inherent instability
of China's state-owned banking system, but also perfectly logical: the bank was
seeking to utilize architecture to embellish a reputation for stability that its own
reputation could not provide alone.
4.6 CRITICISM OF THE URBAN DESIGN
However, despite (or even because of) the grand intentions of the devel-
opment company and their designers, both the architectural and urban design
of the first phase of the area were heavily criticized by the Chinese press. The
buildings were widely seen as each trying to be unique and 'demonstrate their
Fig. 4.9: The renderings of buildings in Finance Street show no other buildings on the
street
individuality' and therefore formed a chaotic whole. As one journalist put it: "The
Construction Bank building, the Investment Plaza, the Commercial Bank build-
ing and the National Enterprise building are merely in the same line, but each of
them wants to be the center."23 Another has commented with Finance Street in
mind: "Today architects are always too ambitious when there is a new project.
They want to give others a shock. Therefore odd-looking buildings are every-
where in the city and they can hardly be in accordance with each other". Given
some of the sources of inspiration for the buildings - such as an ornament dating
from the Shang dynasty - it is hardly surprising that the buildings look strange
together. Further, it is conspicuous that none of the renderings for each of the
buildings produced by respective developers includes any of the other buildings
in Finance Street (see fig. 4.9). This suggests that each building was designed
not only without considering what the other buildings would look like, but without
even envisaging a densely built surrounding environment.
Arguably it may not be the individual developers and architects responsi-
bility for the failure to coordinate their designs, but the failure of an supervising
body - such as either BFSC or the Municipal Planning Commission - to coordi-
nate and regulate the designs. A representative from the development company
acknowledged that the Municipal Government had paid close attention to certain
regulations - such as the so-called 'Sunlight law' - the distance a building needed
to be from another so as not to block their light - but actually left the choice of
building facade and architectural style up to the
individual developers. Urban design generally is
not part of any legal framework, and at most the
government issues 'principles' which it requests
- but does not require - to be followed. The control
plan which assigns uses to areas is perhaps the
closest to a regulation, but this does not stipulate
any physical design characteristics for the site.
Certainly, the pattern of development in Finance
Street is consistent with development practice
across the city. As one developer has damningly
put it: "There's a saying in China: 'Designate your Fig 4.10: The 1993 Height
land as if it were a character' - that is to say, each Gieie moe aiGuidelines imposed a maxi-mum height of 45m for build-
developer walls off, both figuratively and literally, ings in Finance Street
their piece of land and considers the area his own. Anything beyond this 'wall' is
another world that has nothing to do with him. As a result, the city is composed of
a patch work of individual and unrelated developments".26
The buildings on Finance Street have also been criticized for their exces-
sive scale, particularly in relation to the Old City. This is largely a result of the
fact that the heights for the buildings on Finance Street which were stipulated in
the master plan were exceeded. The 1993 Master plan (fig. 4.10) clearly stipu-
lated that the buildings should not be higher than 45m; in fact, as fig. 4.7 shows,
almost all the constructions exceeded this height. Lacking any firm judicial ba-
sis, height limits are instead subject to review by a committee of the Municipal
Government, a process which has repeatedly permitted the breaching of height
guidelines set by Municipal Planning Commission. According to one observer,
developers simply have to persuade the relevant Municipal Government official,
and a height limit that may have been carefully considered by the Municipal Plan-
ning Commission can be overridden.27
Aside from the differing and eccentric architecture, Finance Street has
also been criticized for its urban design. The buildings tend to be far apart from
each other, and tend to be set back not just from the road, but also from the
parcel boundary. The result is that the street is extremely fragmented. These
setbacks tend to be the result of regulations for infrastructure and traffic with
insufficient consideration for the kind of physical environment they would create.
As a planner from the Municipal Planning Commission commented with regards
to Finance Street: the Planning department might want a continuous street, but
the traffic department will want the 'traffic to flow smoothly' and the infrastructure
department will want what they consider sufficient space to lay pipes and other
facilities. In other words, urban design becomes a battle - and a process of ne-
gotiation - between different departments, rather than an outright effort to create
a good physical environment. The emphatic need in particular for traffic to 'flow
smoothly' has resulted in Finance Street as elsewhere in Beijing in roads that are
too wide to support street life; due to a policy that attempts to separate pedes-
trian and car traffic wherever possible, the environment of the area feels oppres-
sive to the pedestrian, despite the extensive efforts at landscaping and creating a
good pedestrian environment.
4.7 LESSONS LEARNED
It is fair to say that in the course of developing Finance Street, both the
Municipal Planning Commission and the BFSC have undergone a learning ex-
perience, both in the sense that they were inexperienced when they initiated the
development and have taken on board many of the 'lessons' from the first phase
of the development. As one planner commented: "The government did not have
a great awareness of the importance of Urban Planning (in the early 90s); our
concern was mainly to stimulate economic growth on Finance Street. Not much
thought was given to the impact of developing Finance Street in the Old City".28
The result was that - throughout Beijing as well as Finance Street - "Only after
the constructions were complete did people realize that they had created these
monstrous and disconnected buildings throughout the city".29 Arguably, they only
realized this then because decisions in Beijing concerning the physical environ-
ment had ended up being influenced more by traffic and infrastructure upgrading
concerns than with how to create a desirable environment. Finance Street falls
into this pattern.
During Phase Two, both the development company and the Municipal
Planning Commission have attempted to improve the planning process. For ex-
ample, the Planning Commission has recognized that the original uses stipulated
for each parcel was too inflexible. Developers would complain that a parcel might
be suitable for retail, but that the plan stipulated building a bank: in essence the
market is demanding something different from what the government wishes to
built.30 The development company have also concluded that "...planning by con-
sidering the urban form (alone) is not necessarily the best way.. .perhaps you
think a particular area might be best served by retail, but after you build it, you
may not be able to attract shops. There should be a study of the existing condi-
tions (and needs) before the urban design begins...". While this may sound obvi-
ous to the Western developer, it is a measure of the lingering planned economy
mindset in the development process in the reform era that a project on the scale
of Finance Street could have been initiated without taking into account existing
market conditions.
Both the development company and the Municipal Government have also
adjusted a number of design aspects of the development for Phase Two. The
development company has stipulated that the height of ground floor must be 6m,
in order to create a more uniform street front. Municipal planning officials have
adjusted regulations for setbacks, to try and ensure that buildings are not as
distant from the street or from each other. Developers of parcels in Phase Two
of Finance Street have been specifically asked to consider how there building will
affect the street and relate to surroundings, unlike before. Most significantly, a
competition for the design of Phase Two was held in 2000, and significantly, only
foreign firms were invited to participate, a tacit acknowledgement on the part of
the BFSC that the original domestically produced plan had shortcomings, per-
haps reflected in the areas failure to attract foreign firms. At the same time, there
is little to suggest that the major shortfalls of the overall planning and political
environment that produced Finance Street have been addressed. These issues
will be explored further in the final chapter.
4.8 SUMMARY
What does the story of Finance Street tell us about redevelopment in
Beijing? Does it suggest the existence of a 'growth regime' as suggested in the
previous chapter?
The development of Finance Street does indeed suggest that an alli-
ance of different government agencies coalesced around the project with differ-
ent objectives in mind. The initiative was launched by the Xicheng District, who
clearly saw an opportunity to develop a prestigious and lucrative banking sector
in their domain, as well as achieve a
dramatic re-imaging of an old area. A
poster showing the 'before' and 'after'
of Finance Street is on the wall of the
District planning office, suggesting its
importance as a political achievement
(see fig. 4.11). The economic impor-
tance of Finance Street for Xicheng
District is now also clear: financial man- Fig. 4.11: Part of a poster hanging on the
agement services within the district - Xicheng District Office wall
which are primarily located in the Street - provide one-quarter of the tax revenues
of the whole District.3 The District Government was supported by the Central
Government banks, who were clearly intent on staying in the area, as well as the
Central Government itself, which supported in the project in the expectation of
seeing a prestigious Chinese 'Wall Street' which would help to recalibrate Beijing
and China's image. The buildings of Finance Street figure prominently in posters
advertising the city. This 'coalition' was politically strong enough to overcome the
objections of the Municipal Planning Commission, whose concern for the Old City
and the balanced development of the city was sidelined.
However, unlike in a Western 'growth coalition', the role of the private sec-
tor is hard to discern. The development was not so much a coalition of private
and public interests as a determined effort by the District Government to promote
economic development, much in the same way as earlier urban development ef-
forts would have been oriented towards industrial development. While the office
space built would ultimately be utilized, it could not be said that the development
of Finance Street was spurred by market pressures or a desire to turn over a
profit, and the development companies' acknowledgement that they conducted
no market research seems to bear this out. In essence, Finance Street is indica-
tive of how the government has endorsed a 'market orientation' but still views
development as to be essentially government driven.
This is borne out both by the fact that much of the space in Finance Street
was not occupied until 1998. Further, many of the tenants have not necessarily
moved there because of its desirability as because of other factors. As one ob-
server has put it "Often prompted by their ministries, Chinese financial institutions
have swamped the area". By contrast, foreign companies, unfettered by political
directives, have been far more circumspect about moving into the area - despite
the fact that the rentals prices are 20-30% cheaper than in the CBD. The poor ac-
cessibility of the area due to its location in the Old City continues to put off many
executives: as one journalist put it, "As Beijing traffic gridlock worsens, many
executives prefer the CBD, based around the China World Trade Center, for its
quicker airport access..."." The competitiveness of the area as a location has
thus been hindered both by its poor accessibility as well as its lack of amenities
- including restaurants, five-star hotels and luxury accommodation. 36 As a re-
sult, while state-run Chinese banks have come to the area, "it has been a harder
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Fig 4.12: Beijing from the Real Estate Developer's Perspective: 'Dueling' CBDs
sell convincing foreign financial institutions to forgo the competing attractions of
the Central Business District in eastern Chaoyang".37 In other words, the market
desirability of Finance Street is hardly established yet.
Although both the development company and the Municipal Government
were keen to present Finance Street as complementing, rather than compet-
ing with, the Chaoyang CBD, real estate developers have seen the areas as
essentially competing for the same clients. Along with the development of the
East Chang'An area in the Dongcheng (East District), companies are faced with
a choice of where to locate, and one that depends more on the evaluating the
respective locations and financial terms rather than their function, as proponents
of the area had suggested. In other words, the area is not so much a functionally
complementing area as a separate and competing CBD, and one whose pres-
ence presumably siphoned off tenants from the Chaoyang CBD.
One scholar has argued that Beijing's 'dueling CBDs' in actual fact mirrors
the dichotomous nature of Chinese economy in the Reform era. 38 While the pri-
vate and international sector seek to locate in the Eastern CBD, many state-run
organizations - particularly the banks - are located in Finance Street; in part be-
cause the location is closer to the ministries with which they regularly communi-
cate, but also because they have been 'invited' to move there by their ministries.
The success of Finance Street, therefore, is as a planned, rather than market,
element of the Chinese economy. As I have argued at the beginning of this chap-
ter, this success has come at enormous price for the Old City of Beijing.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
The conservation and upgrading of Nanchizi, a 9 he area to the east of the
Forbidden City, was intended to represent a breakthrough in conservation plan-
ning in Beijing. For the first time, one of the designated 25 conservation areas
would be simultaneously conserved and upgraded with modern infrastructure,
thus ensuring that the Ancient Capital was simultaneously preserved and mod-
ernized, as all levels of government in Beijing seemed intent on achieving.
However, in the end, what occurred in Nanchizi was an exceptionally
questionable implementation of conservation. In May of 2002, a notice was
placed in Nanchizi that instructed residents that all but 9 of the 240 courtyard
houses in the site would be demolished and replaced with two-story 'historic'
buildings. Within a few months the entire site had been largely cleared and within
a year new housing had been constructed. While the new construction has been
far more historically 'sensitive' than almost all previous developments in Beijing, it
nonetheless can hardly be called successful conservation, involving as it has the
near complete redevelopment of the site. This chapter explores why a develop-
ment process which aimed to conserve one of the 25 designated historic districts
ended with a wholesale redevelopment which drastically reduced the historic
value of the area.
Fig. 5.1: Above, Nanchizi being demolished; below, the new Nanchizi
5.2 BACKGROUND
Nanchizi is an area which borders the Forbidden City, which, prior to the
1800s, was a warehouse and workshop district for the Imperial Court. As the
Emperor's regime reduced the size of the imperial compound, it became a resi-
dential area comprised of a typical Beijing urban fabric of siheyuans and hutongs,
and was opened to the public after the revolution of 1911. Nanchizi Street, which
runs through the area "...is one of a very few with a perfectly preserved atmo-
sphere of classic Old Beijing.. .completely shaded by the branches of mature
Chinese Scholar Trees, and lined with mainly one storey shops serving local
residents".1 Largely because of its location and scenic qualities, Nanchizi was
listed as one of the 25 conservation areas which the Municipal Government des-
ignated in 1990.
In these areas, the Beijing Municipal Government set the goal for the first
time of conserving whole streets and areas rather than individual monuments.
However, exactly how these areas would be 'conserved' was left ambiguous,
without clear policy guidelines until 2000. Indeed, the boundaries of the conser-
vation areas were not even clearly demarcated until 1999. During those years,
the conservation zones "got smaller every year" and one of them, Niu Jie, had
already been demolished and rebuilt as a high rise residential complex.2 The
government could argue that the area had been listed as a conservation area be-
cause it was an ancient Muslim community with a historic mosque. After redevel-
opment, it was still a Muslim community with a historic mosque. In other words,
Fig. 5.2: Left, location of
Nanchizi, right Nanchizi
Street
unlike in the conventional Western diction, conservation need not necessarily
entail a strict preservation of the architecture and urban fabric. With regards to
Nanchizi, a 'conservation' proposal as early as 1993 was made:
"A Development company formed by the local district government formed
by the East District Government has proposed a solution... to redevelop the area
as a low-density, luxury-standard neighborhood of one- and two- storey tradition-
al style courtyard houses. Such a development would conform to the 6m height
limit and traditional image required in other strictly protected historic parts of the
city 3
Hence, even for those areas directly abutting the Forbidden City, conser-
vation could entail a 'sensitive' redevelopment according to guidelines that were
in place until 2000. Interestingly, even in 1993 when the above described scheme
was proposed, a counter-proposal was made by a Tsinghua team headed by Lu
Junhua which advocated a courtyard-by-courtyard upgrading scheme. The con-
trasting nature of these proposals would recur when the area finally came to be
redeveloped.
Conservation guidelines were loose because, for the
most part, very few of the conservation areas were actually
listed for their architectural heritage: they possessed other
qualities which necessitated their conservation, and these
other qualities - which for Nanchizi were its scenic character
and 'traditional' image - would not necessarily be lost in the
course of redevelopment. Additionally, as described in Chap-
ter One, many of the courtyard homes in the historic areas
had become dilapidated and overcrowded, and their historic
value was questionable. In fact, some of the areas were listed
as part of the Old and Dilapidated Program Renewal, includ-
ing Nanchizi, and it was thus necessary for conservation and
improvement in living standards to occur simultaneously. For
several years, however, discussion about redeveloping Nan-
chizi was not permitted by the Municipal Government who
considered the issue sensitive.4  Fig 5.3 On ofthe 1993 Tsinghua
proposals
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Fig. 5.4: The '25 Conservation Areas' plan for Beijing
During this time, conservation policy for the historic areas was substan-
tially tightened between 1999-2000 when 12 organizations were commissioned
to produce plans for each of the historic areas. During this process, five key prin-
ciples under which each of the plans would be shaped emerged: that each of the
areas should preserve the traditional cityscape and hutongs; that the authenticity
of the preserved heritage should be ensured; that preservation should occur us-
ing a gradual and measured method; that the infrastructure and living conditions
of the residents should be improved; and finally that public participation "should
be encouraged".5 These principles represented a decisive turning point in con-
servation planning in Beijing, as for the first time wholesale redevelopment as a
method of conservation was repudiated.
However, what was being recommended by the Municipal Government
had never been successfully done before in Beijing. There was no precedent for
successfully improving the infrastructure and living conditions of residents while
'gradually' preserving the siheyuan and hutongs. Not least because 'preserving'
siheyuans - or, in most cases, restoring them - would necessitate relocating at
least 50% of the residents of the houses, since their overcrowded state would
have to be reversed. This raised a host of issues: which half of the residents
would be relocated? How would the technical issues of upgrading hutongs be
resolved? Perhaps most importantly, who would pay for the improvement of the
area and relocation of the 'surplus' residents, given that land would not be being
released for profitable development as in other areas? Arguably one of the most
critical factors concerning conservation in the Old City of Beijing was that it was
expected to turn over a profit or at worst break even, as redevelopment was in
the hands of developers.
In an effort to resolve these issues, Nanchizi was chosen as a pilot proj-
ect in part to test strategies for these issues. Beijing Vice-Mayor for Construction
Wang Guan Tao announced the project in a municipal conference, explaining that
the redevelopment would closely follow the principles set out in the conservation
plan. In the words of one planner, Nanchizi would be "the paradigm for a new
era of development for Beijing that would strike a balance between conserva-
tion and redevelopment".6 In 1999, the Beijing Institute of Architectural Design
and Research and the School of Architecture at Tsinghua University produced
conservation guidelines for Nanchizi, including an analysis of existing conditions
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and a suggestions for possible strategies of upgrading. The conclusion of their
studies suggested that 82.2% of the area was in the categories that were worthy
of preservation, while 14.2% of the area could be demolished and replaced with
appropriate architecture. A precise plan for how the area would be conserved,
however, was the left to the future.
5.3 THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
From the very beginning of the development process in Nanchizi, there-
fore, the Municipal Government - principally through Wang Guan Tao - would
be involved in the conservation development of Nanchizi. The other institutions
involved would be the Municipal Planning Commission, who had been respon-
sible for drawing up the 25 Conservation Areas Plan, and the East District Gov-
ernment, who would implement the plan decided upon. In a 'typical' redevelop-
ment, the Municipal Government would not get involved in the planning; however,
because of the importance of Nanchizi as a pilot project for the Conservation
Districts, Wang had presumably decided to take a personal interest. Accordingly,
a series of 'control' meetings were held in the course of 2001 and 2002 to decide
upon a planning policy for the area. As always, the politicians of the MG - and
Wang in particular - would have the final decision.
At the beginning, all sides appeared to be in favor of using the court-
yards as the basis for renewing Nanchizi. Four teams were selected to produce
more detailed design schemes for Nanchizi of which one was from the Tsing-
hua School of Architecture.7 The resulting schemes were used as the departure
points for discussion. Both the Tsinghua team and another team - the Beijing
Municipal Infrastructure Design and Research Institute - proposed schemes that
would retain as much of the existing urban fabric and community as possible.
However, neither team produced a detailed plan for how the infrastructure would
be upgraded, or how financing would be raised to pay for the upgrading and re-
storing of homes.
While initially approving of the direction in which the teams suggested the
development of Nanchizi should go, Wang appeared to participants to become
increasingly skeptical over whether the schemes - which essentially focused on
the preservation of the architectural and urban fabric - would actually improve
residents lives. As one participant put it:
"At first it seemed like Wang Guan Tao and the Municipal Planning Com-
mission were presenting a united front. At one meeting, however, you could tell
there was conflict between the two parties. Wang said he did not agree with the
Tsinghua plan for the preservation district because it was not feasible; it was
keeping too many houses. He declared to the team 'What about solving the
resident's problems?"8
Wang argued that the improvement of facilities and living conditions for
residents - by which he meant the infrastructure - should be the first priority of
the conservation effort. As the regulations for upgrading the infrastructure re-
quired widths of hutongs to be at least 7m, this would necessitate widening the
majority of the hutongs on the site and demolishing the buildings which were on
either side of them. While the team considered proposing integrated pipes which
would not have necessitated widening the existing hutongs, this was not their
academic specialty. Further, previous efforts by Tsinghua professors had not per-
suaded the government to explore this strategy.9 In all likelihood the integrated
pipes would have been more costly and involved complicated cooperation be-
tween various government departments to coordinate their installation. According
to one of the observers to the process, Wang made a decision that the upgrading
of infrastructure would take place under the existing inflexible regulations. The
integrated pipes solution would thus not have been seen as a feasible proposal.
Even aside from the infrastructure issue, there was a serious disagree-
ment between the Municipal Government and the Planning Commission over the
quantity of houses on the site that were actually worth preserving. The Tsinghua
plan advocated saving 60-70% of the courtyard houses and rebuilding others;
Wang, by contrast, wrote in his book on the Old City that he considered only 4%
of the buildings on the Nanchizi site worth preserving.10 With so little worth pre-
serving, the inconvenience of devising and gaining approval for new infrastruc-
ture regulations, not to mention the added cost of upgrading the hutongs as they
were, seemed unnecessary.
The disagreement over how much was worth preserving stemmed from
differing concepts of preservation. For the District Government and Wang, only
those buildings which were of undisputed historic value were considered worthy
of preservation, and the majority of the houses on the site were either insufficient-
ly historic or too dilapidated to attain this recognition. By contrast, the Planning
Commission, the Tsinghua team and many of the experts present at the meetings
argued for a broader concept of preservation, arguing that the historic value of
the site lay not in individual buildings but in the collection of houses that make up
the district - the urban fabric. By demolishing all the houses and starting from a
clean slate, they argued, the historic value of the area would be lost, regardless
of how 'appropriate' the new architecture. A courtyard-by-courtyard upgrading
scheme would not only restore and preserve the best houses, but it would pre-
serve the composite characteristics of the area that were arguably more valuable
than the individual houses alone.
Ultimately, Wang and the East District Government rejected the Planning
Commission's perspective. While the infrastructure and preservation factors
that surfaced were undoubtedly factors in their decision, there were undoubt-
edly other motivations for them to reject conserving the area. The most important
of these was arguably financial: the Municipal Government expected the East
District Government to upgrade Nanchizi out of its own budget, and the District
Government in turn wished to redevelop the site and make a profit or at worst
not lose any money. There would obviously be no financial gain from preserving
the community and the courtyard homes; in fact, the conservation would come at
a considerable loss, given the cost of upgrading the hutongs. At an early stage,
the Municipal Government had conducted a pilot scheme in one courtyard in at-
tempting to have half the families pay for the other half to be relocated; however,
the experiment failed because householders either refused to move or refused
to pay for the other families relocation." With no funding available from any other
source, it was unclear where the money could come from to upgrade the hutongs
or even to restore the existing houses.
Further, the Tsinghua plan would likely have not appealed politically to
either the Municipal or the East District Government. The redevelopment of the
area could be seen to benefit the government politically, and, according to their
view, benefit the residents by the increase in their living space despite reloca-
tion. By contrast, the political benefits from a conservation effort are much harder
to define, since without a tested implementation strategy, it was hard to see
how residents could benefit, and the 'public good' or even economic value of
a conserved area (for example, for tourism) seems too obscure for politicians
to recognize. Further, there can be no doubt that the very point of the Tsinghua
scheme was to upgrade the area carefully and with a piecemeal approach, in
order to renew Nanchizi 'organically'. Such an approach, however, would have
been anathema to the politicians of both the Municipal and District Government,
who, as described in Chapter Three, are predisposed to seek to claim credit from
a rapidly achieved, visible achievement. Similarly, the District Government cer-
tainly had targets to meet - an annual quantity of dilapidated housing to reach,
for example - which redevelopment, but not conservation, would enable them to
reach. All in all, it is hard to see successful conservation occurring in this climate,
and one observer to the process, Professor Yin Zhi of Tsinghua, felt that the Ts-
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Fig. 5.6: Competing conservation visions: above, the Tsinghua Conservation plan; below,
the final site plan photographed from the construction site
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inghua scheme had no chance of success from the beginning. In this view, the
citing of infrastructure upgrading concerns as the principal flaw of the Tsinghua
plan may simply have been an effort to discredit a scheme that never suited the
interests of the decision-makers to begin with.
In any case, at some point during March or April of 2001 the decision was
made to adopt a 'wei-gai' or wholesale redevelopment approach to the area. As
would happen in a typical redevelopment, the East District Government would be
in charge of the entire redevelopment, and they in turn arranged for a develop-
ment company closely associated with them to manage the redevelopment of the
area.
5.4 THE REDEVELOPMENT PROCESS
With the decision to redevelop the site made, a notice was posted on walls
around Nanchizi which gave residents one month to move out in May of 2002.
Shortly after, the 'chai' character (meaning demolition) was painted on 231 out of
239 of the houses. Residents were given three options: to return to the new de-
Apt
Infrastructure
Fig. 5.7: The Tsinghua Scheme's proposal for infrastructure was viewed as
unfeasible by the Muncicpal Government
velopment, to be relocated, or to be compensated. Many of them were extremely
unhappy with this arrangement.
According to press reports, only one third of the residents had moved
out by the end of June. Many of the remainder of the residents protested by not
moving out, and even spoke to the media. At that point, what was happening in
Nanchizi became well-known widely, and there was severe criticism of what was
happening in the media. As one resident commented: "What's intolerable is that
our centuries-old houses will be replaced with newly built ancient-style two-sto-
rey buildings, which is a shame to the historic protection zone. Ten academics
wrote to the Municipal Government, arguing that what was happening in Nanchizi
was unacceptable as conservation. Even UNESCO ultimately voiced concern to
the Beijing Municipal Government, noting that while Nanchizi was not a World
Heritage Site, the demolitions were still unacceptable for a historic preservation
areas close to the Forbidden City.14 In the summer of 2002, the media attention
prompted the mayor of Beijing, Liu Qi, to visit the area, and for a brief period, the
demolitions were halted. At this time the Municipal Planning Commission com-
plained that the District Government were destroying too many houses of historic
quality, even notwithstanding their redevelopment approach.15 However, in the
end, the demolitions were ordered to resume, presumably sanctioned by the Mu-
nicipal Government.
The behavior of the special 'relocation' company hired to demolish Nan-
Fig. 5.8: Left, the eviction notice posted on May 1st in Nanchizi. Right, the chai sign was
painted on walls around Nanchizi.
chizi was particularly unfortunate. According to residents, the demolition company
disconnected the utilities of those who had not moved out by the District Govern-
ment deadline, and even on occasion deliberately damaged parts of residents
houses in effort to 'persuade' residents not to complain and to leave. Some resi-
dents were even intimidated into not speaking to the media further.
By the end of August, all the residents had moved out. By the end of the
year, construction had begun on the new buildings of Nanchizi, which are sched-
uled to be complete by the summer of 2003. In all, municipal officials estimate
that 50-60% of the residents of Nanchizi were relocated. 16 Even at a discounted
rate, the cost of returning back to Nanchizi was too great for many of the original
residents. One resident, Mr. Xie, commented how the government offered him
1.5M yuan for his family's 153m2 house - but the cost of buying one of the new
houses was 3.1M yuan. For those who lived in public housing, the compensa-
tion was only 5,900 per M2 , making it very unlikely that any of the poorer resi-
dents would be able to return.17 Most were therefore left them with no choice but
to relocate, presumably far from their original home, as has been the pattern of
relocation in the past decade in Beijing. In the new phase of the development the
cost of purchasing a house is even more expensive: a minimum of 20, 000 yuan
(2,400 dollars) per m2 making the district one of the capital's most exclusive high-
rent areas.
Timeline
Prior to 1 800s Nanchizi a warehousing / workshop district to support Imperial Palace
1800-1990s Nanchizi is a residential area
1911 Nanchizi opens to the public
1990 Beijing Municipal Government announced the names of the twenty five
historic areas in the Old City
1999 Beijing Municipal Government approved the regulatory boundaries of the
twenty five historic areas.
1993 Tsinghua team first commissioned to look into redevelopment/renewal
schemes for Nanchizi
July 2000 Planning of twenty five historic districts to be divided between twelve organi-
zations, including China City Planning and Design Institute, Beijing City Plan-
ning and Design Institute, Tsinghua University.
December 2000 Tsinghua team amongst 4 selected to give design input
March-April Tsinghua team dropped from redevelopment process
2001
June 2002 Demolition signs painted on houses
July 2002 Demolitions halted after media reports
December 2002 Construction begins on new developments
June 2003? Construction scheduled to be finished, residents move in
Fig. 5.9: Timeline for Nanchizi redevelopment
5.5 THE NEW DEVELOPMENT
Nanchizi in its new incarnation is a series of new two storey brick row
houses, with both roofs and detailing of a 'historic' character. However, the new
street pattern bears no relation to how it had been, and little of the new design
evokes the courtyards that had stood on the site. Alongside the residential area
is a newly built park, water feature and villa complex which are a reconstruction
of an old royal garden and the river which used to flow through the area. Like the
architecture of Nanchizi, the villa complex's architecture is a historic pastiche of
Qing dynasty architecture styles which are intended to provide a historic ambi-
ence. The park serves as a local amenity and tourist destination, and the villa
complex complements this function with a new theatre, a VIP club and Belgian
and Chinese restaurants amongst other functions.
Nearby the redeveloped Nanchizi stand a series of posters displaying
the most dilapidated parts of the area prior to redevelopment.18 The displaying
of these posters seems to serve a dual purpose: firstly, like similar photographs
published in the Beijing Finance Street volume, it posthumously legitimizes
the demolition of the area; secondly, it allows for a political achievement to be
claimed, because of the clear contrast between the condition of the area in the
photographs and in its redeveloped form. Naturally, the photographs were cho-
sen of those areas in worst shape in order to accentuate both of these objectives
Fig. 5.10: The new park by the Nanchizi development
.Very little of Nanchizi was in the condition depicted in the posters.19
5.6 CONCLUSION
Clearly, the redevelopment of Nanchizi can not be accepted as legitimate
conservation. While occasional 'historic'-style new construction is permissible in
instances such as the replacement of inappropriate buildings in a historic area,
the whole-sale redevelopment of historic areas is unacceptable. This feeling is
shared not only by Western observers, but by a broad array of Chinese academ-
ics, planners, and residents. The redevelopment of a historic area like Nanchizi is
not, however, without precedent, even in Beijing. As far back as the 1970's Liuli-
chang, a historic arts street, was demolished and rebuilt as a recreated Qing dy-
nasty street intended for tourists. In recent years, the redevelopment of Ping'An
Avenue involved the demolition of historic architecture and its replacement with
similarly pastiche Qing dynasty architecture. These projects, along with Nan-
chizi, have essentially been real estate development projects taking place under
stringent urban design guidelines.
Further, in Nanchizi, the planning principles which were set down by the
Municipal Planning Commission for the 25 Conservation Areas were clearly
breached. As described in the previous chapter, the planning principles and
guidelines of the MPC, even when formally approved by the Municipal Govern-
ment, are liable to be broken at any time by an arbitrary decision by a politician.
As with the height limits policy or the 1991 Master plan, the MPC's plans lack any
Fig. 5.11: Posters in the redeveloped Nanchizi portraying condtions of Nanchizi in its
kind of legal or regulatory weight. This is especially critical because the imple-
mentation of the MPC's plans is usually carried out by other bodies, usually the
District Governments. Without legal weight, the District Government can ignore
the plans and guidelines if supported by the Municipal Government. As one Mu-
nicipal Planning official commented with regards to Nanchizi: "The plan had been
approved by the Municipal Government but the problem was the Mayor. He didn't
like the approved plan so he told the district level that they could veto the plan.
The mayor had all the power in this case".20 In this sense, conservation planning
fails because of the same reason urban planning in general is frequently ineffec-
tive: too much power, ultimately, is left to the discretion of individuals who may be
acting from a political perspective, rather than from the city's best interests.
Conservation planning may also fail for an even simpler reason: the speed
which it is expected to be carried out. Taking place at the same breakneck speed
as other redevelopment projects in Beijing, Nanchizi was designated as a pilot
project in late 2001; demolished in 2002 and rebuilt by the middle of 2003.21 This
is incredibly fast - too fast - for a conservation project to take place in. Again, the
political climate is not conducive to the kind of care that is the precursor to suc-
cessful conservation.
Similarly, a further lesson from Nanchizi is that financing of conservation
needs to rethought at all levels of government. Again, it may be impossible to
carry out successful conservation under the current 'break-even or make a profit'
financing climate. As one planner put it:
"The main problem is the lack of funding. No matter how brilliant our pro-
posals are, they are always impossible to realize without proper funding. When
we draw up plans for the conservation districts, we assess whether it is technical-
ly feasible but what ends up happening is that they are not practically feasible"22
The Beijing Municipal Government has currently allocated just 40M$
for the conservation of the designated historic areas - a fraction of the amount
required to conserve them properly.23 Unless money can be found elsewhere
- either from the Central Government, or diverted from a city-wide property tax,
or even from conservation NGOs - it is hard to see how Nanchizi will not be
repeated in other historic areas in Beijing and across China. While its hard to put
an economic value on the successful conservation of areas of Beijing, it would
clearly be an asset of incalculable value for Beijing in the long-term, from both a
heritage and a tourism perspective. Indeed one commentator has recently written
that: "Hutong tourism in Beijing is one of most successful schemes of vernacular
house tourism in China".24 Presumably the attraction of authentic historic areas
will be considerably higher than of recreated areas.
It is also clearly critical for more pilot projects to be carried out, particu-
larly exploring ways to upgrade infrastructure and to relocate some residents of
courtyard homes. Infrastructure regulations need to be more flexible, and the
latest technology for infrastructure needs to be sought. The alternative to this
is that historic areas will remain without basic infrastructure or be demolished
because they can not be both conserved and upgraded. Clearly, this is hard to
accept. As one observer to the Nanchizi redevelopment commented: "Wang
wanted to try and achieve the goal (of upgrading infrastructure) within the current
standards.. .to improve the living conditions in the hutongs. While its important
to improve the living conditions, we can't just do at the expense of thousands of
years of architecture". Similarly, more inventive policies need to be explored with
regards to the relocation of residents of courtyard homes. Not all residents would
want to stay if offered a centrally located modern living accommodation which
was centrally located was offered to them. Successful pilot projects would help to
persuade politicians that conservation along the lines proposed by the Municipal
Planning Commission is actually feasible.
Were it not for the way the redevelopment took place and the fact that a
historic area was demolished, Nanchizi might otherwise be considered a suc-
cess, given the sensitive style of the new architecture which obeys height regula-
tions and the high resident return rate. However, as an attempt at conservation,
it is a failure, and if is repeated in the remainder of the 25 conservation areas,
there will be no districts of historic value left in the city.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
6.1 SUMMARY
6.2 LESSONS FROM DASHILAN AND SHISHAHAI
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION
6.1 SUMMARY
Despite both case-studies having dramatically different end-results, they
share common characteristics in the process by which they were redeveloped.
In both Nanchizi and Finance Street, the Municipal Planning Commission's plans
were breached in a severe fashion. In Finance Street, the 1991 Master plan was
contravened in the positioning of the Finance Street CBD, and Nanchizi was re-
developed rather than organically renewed as the 2000 Conservation plan stipu-
lated. The Municipal Planning Commission height limits were widely ignored in
the development of Finance Street.
The case-studies thus seem to confirm the proposition made in Chap-
ters Two and Three: that redevelopment is dominated by politicians, who in turn
are driven by political objectives. This is particularly true of District Government
politicians, who implement the majority of urban development in the city (if not
always the largest projects) and who have a tendency to act exclusively in what
they believe are the best economic interests of the district. While this may be
understandable, the failure of the Municipal Government to prevent them from
succeeding in urban development that benefits the District at the expense of the
overall city is unfortunate.
Both redevelopments also demonstrated the impact of the bureaucracy of
the planning procedure on the physical environment. In Finance Street, regula-
tions for infrastructure and traffic competed with physical planning considerations
to result in a fragmented street. In Nanchizi, a failure to utilize integrated pipes
was cited as an excuse for not upgrading the hutongs because they were too
narrow, and instead opting to redevelop the majority of them.
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Notwithstanding these similarities, the development of the two areas took
place under very different planning climates. In 1992-3, when Finance Street was
planned, conservation was barely on the agenda in Beijing; by contrast the devel-
opment of Nanchizi was originated (admittedly with an entirely different agenda
in mind) with advanced conservation principles in mind. Had the redevelopment
taken place in the early '90s, it may have been considerably less sensitive to
conservation principles. Similarly, had Finance Street been developed a decade
later, the urban design may have been far superior, as the planning for the sec-
ond phase has been. Clearly urban planning is improving in Beijing, even if many
of the structural shortfalls of the system remain.
Many of these shortfalls are shared by Chinese governance as a whole,
and should therefore be understood in a much wider context. During the SARS
episode, one journalist wrote the following about China:
"Its system of governance still has no mechanisms to ensure the account-
ability of officials or to bring problems to light. It possesses no system of checks
and balances, no independent watchdog agencies, no truly free press. It lacks
transparency and treats information as secret that would, in a society like ours,
be considered the stuff of newspaper reports, regulatory disclosure and congres-
sional hearings."
All this is true of urban development in Beijing and China, which has no
real accountability, no watchdog agencies and no mechanism of addressing
problems that emerge beyond the personal discretion of the officials involved.
Arguably, only true political and institutional reform which addresses these issues
will improve the course of urban development and redevelopment in Beijing.
6.2 LESSONS FROM SHISHAHAI AND DASHILAN
In the short term, however, recent instances of conservation planning in
Dashilan and Shishahai offer lessons for urban planning for the city as a whole.
Firstly, for Dashilan a conservation design competition was held for the first time
in Beijing. This in itself was a major step forward for conservation, demonstrating
the Municipal Government's willingness to gather fresh ideas for conservation, if
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not necessarily their ability to implement them. For example, one team adopted
an inventive approach towards the problem of installing infrastructure in the
hutongs in their proposal: "Since the hutong network was dense in this district,
we proposed to use two hutongs to support the infrastructure additions that would
normally be placed under one single street.. .we shouldn't treat the old district like
a new area and think that the only way to build infrastructure is to place it under a
wide roadway".2 According to one of the planners involved in the organization of
the competition, the local companies were more conservationist than the inter-
national firms.3 This confirms what the Nanchizi case suggests: that there is no
shortage of excellent conservation planners in Beijing, but a failure to implement
their plans successfully.
One of the striking elements to emerge from the Dashilan competition is
that the Municipal Planning Commission is exploring the possibility of not only re-
newing the houses organically without wholesale redevelopment, but of reducing
the population by relocation not to distant areas but to nearby affordable housing.
This offers the hugely exciting possibility that Beijing may arrive at arguably its
best solution to its redevelopment and conservation problems yet: the preserva-
tion of the architectural and urban fabric of a historic district (and the improve-
ment of living conditions for residents) while preserving to the greatest extent
possible the community on-site.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the planning for Dashilan will
overcome familiar difficulties with its implementation. According to one of the
planners involved in the competition for Dashilan, the main threat to the conser-
vation of the area is the extension of the Municipal Road Network to the area. As
she commented: "We felt it would ruin the existing fabric of the area. Dashilan
is a destination therefore we saw no need for an urban road to go through the
area".4 Similarly, the attitude of the District Government and the Development
company responsible for the area remains a concern, in that planners are skepti-
cal that they actually want to preserve the area. It seems perfectly possible that
a similar conflict of visions to that which arose in Nanchizi between the Municipal
Planning Commission and the District Government may yet arise.
There have also been interesting development trends occurring in Shisha-
hai which have actually gone beyond the planning stage. A small-scale redevel-
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opment approach has involved in rebuilding some siheyuan homes as homes for
the wealthy, mainly in the Ya'er Hutong. While this approach still involves relocat-
ing the original residents, it does at least preserve some of the architectural fabric
and scale of the area. However, as academics have pointed out, this approach is
not only no better for conserving the communities, but it also does not preserve
Fig. 6.1: In the recent
Conservation design
competition for Dashilan,
one team produced an
innovative traffic and
infrastructure strategy
(right) to avoid having a
wide road entering the
area that might dam- M
age Dashilan's vibrant
streetlife (below)
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the architecture for the general public. As one planner put it: "the current court-
yard houses in Dashilan are shared by many households, it is very easy to walk
in and experience the atmosphere of the courtyard house. If the houses are oc-
cupied by the wealthy, the front doors are most likely going to remain locked".
A more appealing trend in Shishahai has been the conversion of a number
of courtyard homes into amenities such as bars and restaurants. Typically this
has been a 'bottom-up' development: individual entrepreneurs have renovated
courtyard homes, often with considerable style, and the result is a far more di-
verse and interesting area than would have been created with a large-scale rede-
velopment. This seems to suggest, particularly for tourist areas such as Dashilan,
that the government simply needs to upgrade the infrastructure of hutong areas
and clarify the property rights of the residents of courtyard homes and let the
market renew the area organically. However, whether the Beijing Municipal and
District Governments would be willing to embrace a more passive role, particu-
larly one that denies them the political credit for redevelopment, remains to be
seen.
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION
As noted earlier, both the Conservation Planning of 2000 and the competi-
tion for Dashilan indicate there is no shortage of first-rate conservation planning
in Beijing. However, clearly these plans have broken down in the implementa-
tion. How then can the implementation for urban planning - and by extension the
redevelopment process itself - be improved? While it is dubious to suggest the
Fig. 6.2: Two interesting development trends in Shishahai: Siheyuan for the wealthy (left)
and as 'gentrified' bars and restaurants (right)
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imposition of Western planning models on Beijing, there are nonetheless several
obvious directions for the improvement of the planning process that emerge from
this study.
- Legal weight for planning regulations. Ideally, regulations should be
open documents and with clear accountability for their authors, as well as
having a legal weight to them that would prevent them from being arbi-
trarily changed. The MPC's recently initiated 'Sunshine Program' maybe a
step in this direction: the program aims to "...(inform) the public of all rel-
evant rules, regulations and projects.. .(to ensure that) the government will
be under stricter control and no one will have the right to change projects
arbitrarily once they have been decided".5
- Increased supervision of conservation planning by the Municipal
Government. Some planners have suggested that the actual implementa-
tion of planning in Conservation districts should actually be done by the
Municipal Government, since there may be no effective way to force the
District Governments to execute conservation planning. Certainly until
planning regulations have legal weight, this may be most obvious short-
cut to successful planning implementation in Beijing. Notably, the Beijing
Municipal Government - and the Capital Planning Commission - manages
other large projects, such as the Olympic area and the CBD. It does not
therefore seem far-fetched that they should also manage the Conservation
areas.
- More integrated planning. Clearly planning should set the goal of cre-
ating or preserving the best possible physical environment, rather than
automatically catering for the regulations of inflexible traffic and infrastruc-
ture departments, which have historically not respected the historic nature
of Old Beijing. The latter departments should be subordinated beneath the
planning department, and far more inventive traffic and infrastructure poli-
cies need to be devised to avoid the destruction of historic fabric and the
creation of inconveniently scaled environments.
- More participatory planning. This was stipulated as one of the principles
of the 2000 Conservation plan. Even aside from the democratic implica-
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tions of involving the governed in governance, bringing the views of resi-
dents into the process would help to address one of the chief shortfalls
of planning in China: it's paternalistic, top-down nature, with officials with
a poor knowledge of resident's lives making decisions with an enormous
social impact from primarily a physical or economic perspective.
- More encouragement of 'bottom-up' urban development. As redevel-
opment in Shishahai has demonstrated, private entrepreneurs left to their
own devices and properly regulated can develop an area in a far more
sympathetic and organic fashion that a large-scale redevelopment could
achieve. As has been emphasized many times by academics and other
experts, the establishing of a clear legal property ownership framework
- involving the selling of publicly-owned siheyuan housing to their resi-
dents - would almost automatically entail the improvement of districts,
as the sale of public housing has done in many other cities in other parts
of the world. The government could then limit its role to the upgrading of
infrastructure.
- Slow down the pace of development. It is perhaps unsurprising that
the planning for both Finance Street and Nanchizi was flawed, given the
astonishing pace that both were developed at. The speed of develop-
ment should be slowed down, particularly for conservation, to allow better
thought out plans which have had input from a wider constituency . In the
Dashilan Conservation Competition, competition entrants were given only
two months to prepare plans, which one team acknowledged was insuf-
ficient to come up financial feasibility proposals that would added a critical
practical dimension to their proposal.6
- A different financing climate for conservation. Clearly conservation in
Beijing has been severely frustrated by a financing climate that attaches
too little priority to the proper conservation of residential districts. The loss
of the world heritage resource that the Conservation districts in Old Bei-
jing represent is simply too devastating for a shortage of funding alone
to precipitate. In other words, funds have to be found from somewhere,
particularly for the upgrading of infrastructure which is clearly a vital pre-
requisite both for the improvement of living standards for the residents of
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the hutongs, but also ultimately their successful conservation. This funding
does not necessarily have to come from the Central Government, and far
more inventive ways of finding it could be employed: a municipal tourist
tax, international conservation NGOs, an international fund-raising cam-
paign and so forth. However, one obstacle to this is that foreign funding
can only be channeled to the Chinese Central Government, it cannot, for
example, be directly attached to a particular district or preservation area.
Clearly, this should be reformed to allow external sources of funds to aid
conservation efforts. There can be no doubt that the current paradigm of
expecting conservation to pay for itself can only result in projects like Nan-
chizi.
A re-thinking of Beijing's transportation plan. As suggested earlier, the
demands of the Beijing municipal traffic plan frequently jeopardize both the
street life of the city and conservation generally. The municipalities current
traffic plan involves extending the road network into Dashilan and Shisha-
hai, which would have disastrous conservation consequences for two of
the most important historic districts remaining in Beijing. A transportation
plan that prioritized conservation and considered alternative strategies to
transportation requirements - including increasing the use of transit and
incorporated more comprehensive traffic management strategies - would
clearly hugely benefit conservation and the quality of life in the city.
As hard as improving urban and conservation planning implementation
may be, the stakes could hardly be greater. Old Beijing is rapidly reaching the
point where very soon the question of preserving historic districts is an academic
issue. If the regime would extend what it considered sacrosanct to the historic ar-
eas of the city and not just the monuments, the future of both social and architec-
tural conservation in the city would be far brighter. After all, at points in Beijing's
recent history both the demolition of Tiananmen Square and the redevelopment
of the Summer Palace were proposed. Neither were permitted to happen. A simi-
lar level of stringent protection should apply to the city's conservation areas. The
opportunity to conserve a critical part of China's heritage and improve the rede-
velopment process in arguably the world's most historic city should not be missed
by the decision-makers in Beijing.
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(Footnotes)
1 Kaufman (2003)
2 Zhao (2003)
3 Huang (2003)
4 Zhao (2003)
5 Wire Report (2003c).
6 Zhao (2003)
110
ILLUSTRATION SOURCES
Fig. Source
1,1 Map provided by Beijing Municipal Planning Commission. amended by author
1.2 Top picture by Ozgur Alkan, bottom by author
1.3 From Wu (1999)
1.4 Siheyuan from Abramson (2001), Hutong picture from Xu (1990)
1.5 Table after Wang (2002c)
1.6 From Tsinghua archive
1.7 Sit (1996)
1.8 Left photograph from Xu (1990), right graphic from Wu (1999)
1.9 Top and middle photographs by author, bottom from Tan (1998)
1.10 Top from Lu (1993), bottom photograph by author
2.1 Chart by author from data from Gu and Shen (2003)
2.2 Timeline prepared by author
2.3 Map adapted from Lu (1997)
2.4 Left and middle photographs by author, right photograph by OzgurAlkan
2.5 Chart by author, data and chart from Fang and Zhang (forthcoming)
3.1 Top illustration from Zheng (1995), bottom by author from discussion with Tsinghua
students
3.2 Top and bottom photographs by author
3.3 Top and bottom photographs by author
3.4 Gaubatz (1995)
4.1 Wang (1999)
4.2 Top photographs from Wang (1999), bottom by author
4.3 Top and bottom photographs from Wang (1999)
4.4 Timeline prepared by author
4.5 Map provided by Beijing Municipal Planning Commission, amended by author
4.6 Left photograph from Wang (1999), right by author
4.7 Table data from Wang (1999), bottom photographs by author
4.8 Provided by the BFSC
4.9 Wang (1999)
4.10 Leaf(1995)
4.11 Photograph by author
4.12 Jones Lang Lasalle (2002)
5.1 Top and bottom photographs by author
112
5.2 Left illustration from Beijing Municipal Planning Commission (2002), right photograph by
author.
5.3 Lu (1993)
5.4 Map provided by Beijing Municipal Planning Commission
5.5 Data and map from Beijing Municipal Planning Commission (2002)
5.6 Top illustration by Tsinghua University, bottom photograph by author
5.7 Map by Tsinghua University
5.8 Both photographs by author
5.9 Timeline prepared by author
5.10 Left graphic from magazine article, right photograph by author
5.11 Both photographs by author
6.1 From Dashilan competition entry
6.2 Both photographs by author
REFERENCES
Wire Report (2000). "Development still forcing out residents". South China Morn-
ing Post, Hong Kong. 24/01/00
Wire Report (2001 a). "Leader Wen Jiabao warns against 'showy' projects in ur-
banization drive". Xinhua News Agency Report, Beijing. 24/6/01
Wire Report (2001 b). "People Pressure". China Economic Review, Beijing.
Wire Report (2003a). "Beijing begins razing traditional homes in shadow of For-
bidden City". Agence France-Presse, Beijing. 19/02/03
Wire Report (2003b). "Beijing developers destroyed one third of courtyard homes
in 15 years". Agence France Presse, Beijing. 04/04/03
Wire Report (2003c). "Beijing to increase transparency on urban planning". Xin-
hua News Agency, Beijing. 13/03/03
Wire Report (2003d). "Beijing to Well Protect Cultural Heritage in Preparation of
Olympics". China Daily, Beijing. 20/01/03
Wire Report (2003e). "Beijing's courtyard homes vanishing". The Straits Times,
Singapore. 03/02/03
Wire Report (2003f). "Unesco raises concern over destruction of Beijing historical
area". Agence France-Presse, Beijing. 25/02/03
Abramson, D. (1997a). "Marketisation & institutions in Chinese inner-city redevel-
opment." Cities 14(2): 71-75.
Abramson, D. (1997b). Neighborhood redevelopment as a cultural problem: a
western perspective on current plans for the old city of Beijing. Doctoral
Dissertation. Beijing, Tsinghua University.
Abramson, D. (2001). "Beijing's Preservation Policy and the Fate of the Siheyu-
an." Traditional dwellings and settlement review 13(1): 7-22.
Abramson, D., M. Leaf, et al. (2002). Social Research and the Localization of
Chinese Urban Planning Practice: Some Ideas from Quanzhou, Fujian.
The new Chinese city : globalization and market reform. Ed. J. R. Logan.
Anon. (1998a). "Architectonic Ideas of the Architects of Finance Street (in Chi-
nese)".
Anon. (1998b). "Overall Arrangement and Plans of Finance Street (in Chinese)."
Architect 83.
Anon. (2003). Interview with author and B. Chen. Beijing. 01/03. This interviewee
was an observer to the Nanchizi design process
Beijing Municipal Planning Commission (2002) Conservation Planning of the 25
Historic Areas Beijing, Yan Shang Publishing Company.
Bierut, B. and Warsaw Biuro Urbanistyczne (1951). The six-year plan for the re-
construction of Warsaw. Warszawa, Ksiazka i Wiedza.
Brahm, L. (2002). Interview with author and B. Chen. Beijing, PRC. 07/02. Law-
rence Brahm is author of 'China as no.1 : the new superpower takes
centre stage'
Broudehoux, A.-M. (1999). Modernity with Chinese Characteristics. PhD. Thesis.
Berkeley, UC Berkeley.
113
Chen, S. K. J. (2000). Land management practice in Fuzhou, People's Republic
of China. Master's Thesis. Vancouver, University of British Columbia.
Citistar (2003). "Beijing Foreign Approved Residential Market C June 2001".
From the Citistar website at http://www.citistar.com.cn/english/market.htm,
Beijing. 31/8/03
De Monchaux, J. (2003). Interview with author and B. Chen. Cambridge, MA.
03/03. John De Monchaux is a Professor of Architecture and Urban Plan-
ning at MIT
Deng, F. F. (forthcoming). The Political Economy of Public Land Leasing in Urban
China. Public Leasehold: International Experience in Public Land Leasing.
Ed. S. Bourassa and Y.-H. Hong, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Dong, G. (2003). Interview with author and B. Chen. Beijing, PRC. 04/02/03.
Dong Guanqi was the director of the Municipal Planning Commission of
Beiing during the 1990's
Eckholm, E. (1998). "A Burst of Renewal Sweeps Old Beijing Into the Dump-
sters". New York Times, New York. 28/02/98
EhouseE.com (2003). "Beijing Office". From the EhouseE.com website http:
//www.ehousee.com/ywb/rent/beiiing.htm, Beijing. 31/8/03
Fang, K. (1998). "Reviewing the 'Finance Street' Phenomenon from the Perspec-
tive of Urban Planning: Some Critical problems in the Urban Planning and
Construction of Beijing." Architect 83(19-22).
Fang, K. and Y. Zhang (1998). "Beijing at the Cross-Road (in Chinese)." Architect
84.
Fang, K. and Y. Zhang (forthcoming). "Plan and Market Mismatch: Urban Rede-
velopment in Beijing During a Period of Transition." Asia Pacific Viewpoint
44(2).
Fogelson, R. M. (2001). Downtown : its rise and fall, 1880-1950. New Haven,
Yale University Press.
Fong, F. F. (2003). Interview with author and B. Chen. Beijing. 01/03. Ms. Fong is
a planner at the Beijing Municipal Planning Commission
Fried, M. (1966). Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation.
Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy. Ed. J. Wilson. Cam-
bridge, MIT Press.
Gar-on, Y. and F. Wu (1999). "The transformation of the urban planning system in
China from a centrally-planned to transitional economy." Progress in Plan-
ning 51(3): 167-252.
Gaubatz, P. (1995). "Changing Beijing." Geographic Review 85(1): 79-96.
Gu, C. and J. Shen (2003). "Transformation of urban socio-spatial structure in
socialist
market economies: the case of Beijing." Habitat International 27: 107-122.
Hou, Z. N. (2003). Interview with author and B. Chen. Beijing, PRC. 28/03/03.
Ms. Hou is the Vice-President of Finance Street Holding Co., Ltd
Huang, H. and J. Shi (1991). "Renovation Project of Dangerous Old Houses in
Xiao Hou Cang Lane." China City Planning Review June: 46-52.
Huang, Y. (2003). Interview with author and B. Chen. Beijing. 01/03.
114
Jia, H. (2002). "Renovation plan sparks heated debate". China Daily, Beijing.
10/7/02
Jones Lang Lasalle (2002). Beijing Property Index: The Market as at January
2002. Beijing.
Kaufman, J. (2003). "Can China Cure Its Severe Acute Reluctance to Speak?"
Washington Post, Washington. 27/04/03
Kleniewski, N. (1984). From Industrial to Corporate City: The Role of Urban Re-
newal. Marxism and the Metropolis. Ed. W. K. Tabb and L. Sawers. New
York, Oxford University Press.
Leaf, M. (1995). "Inner city redevelopment in China: implication for the city of
Beijing." Cities 12(3): 149-162.
Leaf, M. (1998). "Urban Planning and Urban Reality under Chinese economic
reforms." Journal of Planning Education and Research 18(2): 145-153.
Leow, J. (2001). "Beijing fuels debate as it razes Old Alleys". The Straits Times,
Singapore. 30/11/01
Lin, S. (2002). Interview with author and B. Chen. Beijing. 07/02. Mr. Lin is one of
Beijing's most prominent developers
Logan, J. R. and H. L. Molotch (1987). Urban fortunes : the political economy of
place. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press.
Lu, J. (1993). "Beijing's Old and Dilipadated Housing Renewal (Part II)." China
City Planning Review.
Lu, J. (1997). "Beijing's old and dilipidated housing renewal." Cities 14(2): 59-69.
Macleod, C. (2001). "Will they come? Questions remain over Beijing Finance
Street's potential". Beijing ChinaOnline News Report, 16/05/01
Mollenkopf, J. H. (1983). The contested city. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University
Press.
Molotch, H. (1976). "The city as a growth machine: Toward a political economy of
place." American Journal of Sociology 82: 309-330.
Mufson, S. (1997). "China's Party Expels Ex-Beijing Chief'. Washington Post,
Washington. 10/9/97
Nilsson, J. (1998). "Problems and possibilities in today's urban renewal in the Old
City of Beijing." City Planning(4): 42-46.
O'Neill, M. (2000). "The city that went under the hammer". South China Morning
Post, Hong Kong. 1st January 2000
O'Neill, M. (2003). "Home truths". South China Morning Post, Hong Kong. 13/01/
03
Rosegrant, S. (1998). The Widening of Ping'An Avenue: Making Decisions about
Historic Preservation. Cambridge, MA, Kennedy School of Government
Case Study.
Rowe, P. (2003). Interview with author and B. Chen. Cambridge, MA, USA. 17/
02/02. Peter Rowe is Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Design
Sit, V. (1996). "Soviet influence on urban planning in Beijing, 1949-1991." The
Town planning review 67(4): 457-484.
Steinhardt, N. (1999). Chinese Imperial City Planning, University of Hawaii Press.
Sui, C. (2001 a). "Beijing's old neighbourhoods razed to make way for Olympics".
115
Agence France Presse, Beijing. 06/09/01
Sui, C. (2001 b). "China's Olympic dream fueling destruction of Old Beijing".
Agence France Presse, Beijing. 24/08/01
Tan, Y. (1994). "Social Aspects of Beijing's Old and Dilapidated Housing Renew-
al." China City Planning Review 10(4): 45-55.
Tan, Y. (1998). Relocation and the People -A Research on Neighborhood Re-
newal in the Old City of Beijing. Presented at Shelter and Revitalization,
Havana, Cuba, March 28 - April 3 1998.
Wang, G., Ed. (1999). Beijing Finance Street. Beijing, China Architecture & Build-
ing Press.
Wang, G. T. (2002a). The Preservation and Development of Beiiing as a Historic
and Culturally Significant City (in Chinese). Beijing, Xinhua Press.
Wang, J. (2002b). "A Historical Study of Liang and Chen's Beijing Project." Dia-
logue(55): 97-105.
Wang, N. (1997). "Vernacular house as an attraction: illustration from hutong
tourism in Beijing." Tourism Management 18(8): 573-580.
Wang, Y. (2002c). A Brief History of the Transformation of Beijing's Urban Fabric
in the Twentieth Century. Phd. First Year Paper (unpublished). Cambridge,
Cambridge University.
Wong, S. (2001). "Building up the momentum". South China Morning Post, Hong
Kong. September 5, 2001
Wu, F. (2002). "China's Changing Urban Governance in the Transition Towards a
More Market-oriented Economy." Urban Studies 39(7): 1071-1093.
Wu, L. (1999). Rehabilitating the old city of Beiiing : a project in the Ju'er Hutong
neighbourhood. Vancouver, UBC Press.
Xicheng District (2003). "Introduction to Industries". From the Xicheng Distict
website at http://www.bixch.gov.cn/en/economy/introduction.htm, Beijing.
31/8/03
Xu, Y. (1990). Beiiing hutong 101 photos. Hangzhou, Zhejiang she ying chu ban
she.
Yin, Z. (2003). Interview with author and B. Chen. Beijing, PRC. 30/01/03. Yin Zhi
is a professor at Tsinghua University
Zhang, J. (1997). "Informal construction in Beijing's old neighborhoods." Cities
14(2): 85-94.
Zhang, J. (2003). Interview with author and B. Chen. Beijing, PRC. 15/01/03.
Zhang Jie is an architecture and urban planning professor at Tsinghua
University, Beijing
Zhang, J., M. Liu, et al. (1998). "What happens to buildings in Finance Street? (in
Chinese)." Architect 83: 14-19.
Zhang, T. (2002a). "Challenges Facing Chinese Planners in Transitional China."
Journal of Planning Education and Research 22: 64-76.
Zhang, T. (2002b). "Urban Development and a Socialist Pro-Growth Coalition in
Shanghai." Urban Affairs Review 37(4): 475-499.
Zhang, T. (forthcoming). "Decentralization, Localization, and the Emergence of a
Quasi-Participatory Decision-Making Structure in Urban Development in
116
Shanghai ."
Zhang, Y. (2000). Poetics and Politics of Housing in the Inner City of Beiiing. Pre-
sented at ACSP Conference, Atlanta, 03/11/00
Zhao, D. R. and P. X. Yu (1998). "The positioning and other Problems of Finance
Street (in Chinese)." Architect 83: 4-14.
Zhao, P. (2003). Interview by author and B. Chen. Beijing, PRC. 18/03/03. Ms.
Zhao works for the Beijing Academy of Urban Planning
Zheng, L. (1995). Housing Renewal in Beijing - Observation and Analysis. Mas-
ter's Thesis. Montreal, McGill University.
Zhou, Y. (1999). "Beijing and the Development of Dual Central Business Dis-
tricts." The Geographical Review 88(3): 429-436.
Zhu, J. (1999). "Local growth coalition: the impact and implications of China's
gradualist land reforms." International Journal of Urban and Regional Re-
search 23: 534-548.
Zhu, J. (2003). Interview with author and B. Chen. Beijing. 03/03. Mr. Zhu is the
director of the Beiing Municipal Planning Institute
Zingg, E. (2000). "National Theatre project hastens destruction of Old Beijing".
Agency France Presse, 14/02/2000
117
